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WHEN DOES COPYRIGHT LAW REQUIRE 
TECHNOLOGY BLINDNESS? 
AIKEN MEETS AEREO
Yvette Joy Liebesman†
ABSTRACT
Within the Copyright Act, innovation and technological advances are the bases for the 
enactment or amendment of many sections. Technology is often fundamental to the 
language of the section, and the underlying technology matters even when it is paired with a 
technology-neutral section. And because technology matters, how it functions could be 
essential in resolving a copyright infringement dispute. 
One such provision, 17 U.S.C. § 110(5), allows small businesses to “publicly perform” 
copyrighted music via a radio, as long as certain conditions regarding the equipment used 
are met. Only small businesses are eligible, and the proprietors can only use systems that are 
commonly found in homes. In addition, the performance cannot be retransmitted to 
another location, and only a single receiving apparatus can be used. Known as the “Aiken” or 
“Homestyle” Exemption, when Congress codified the § 110(5) of the Copyright Act of 
1976, these seemed like reasonable limitations. At the time, lawmakers did not contemplate 
or even envision the existence or commercialization of wireless speaker technology. Now, 
however, one can connect a cellphone, iPod, MP3 player, or other portable electronic 
device via Bluetooth, standard radio, or even the Internet, to a wireless speaker. When 
determining whether a system falls within the Homestyle Exemption, both Congress and 
the courts have stressed the importance of examining the underlying technology. 
Technology matters in the Copyright Act. 
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in American Broadcasting Cos. v. Aereo, Inc. has 
thrown the principle of “technology matters” into flux. The majority affirmatively construed 
the Transmit Clause as it related to several technology-specific sections of the Act in a 
technology-blind manner; indeed, it held that the underlying technological architecture of 
an allegedly infringing system was irrelevant. This decision may have wide-reaching effects, 
and cannot be viewed in a vacuum. When examined in relation to other sections of the 
Copyright Act of 1976, it behooves us to question whether this is what Congress intended. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In many sections of the Copyright Act, the technology used by the 
relevant actors is germane both at its enactment and in later applications 
of the law. An examination of § 110(5)—the Homestyle Exemption—
exemplifies this. Imagine we are walking past various shops in a mall. First 
we enter a clothing store, and through speakers on the wall we hear a local 
rock radio station. The second store—selling boots and hats—is playing 
music from a country-western station. The stereo system in both of these 
stores is comprised of speakers attached to a radio receiver via “speaker 
wire.” Next, we enter a pet store, where soft, classical music is heard above 
the sweet yelping of puppies (all wanting us to take them home). The 
music is broadcast through a “boom box” (which contains a radio receiver 
and two speakers in a single device) behind the cashier’s counter. 
The proprietor of the fourth shop we visit also is playing radio music 
via a stereo system, similar to the other three. However, the owner of this 
establishment, when choosing among the variety of options at the local 
electronics store, fell in love with the new Polk® Audio home stereo 
wireless system, which consists of a radio with a built-in Bluetooth 
transmitter and two wireless speakers. The sound is amazing, and the 
installation costs were significantly less than drilling holes and running 
speaker wire. The fifth shop we pass is also using a wireless speaker 
system. This one consists of a standard Radio Frequency (RF) 
transmitter—the type common in transistor radios—attached to the stereo 
receiver base located in the storeroom. The RF transmitter broadcasts on a 
common frequency to two wireless speakers located on the sales floor. 
We usually do not think much about the source of the music that we 
hear in these stores or the copyright implications of playing music for the 
enjoyment of customers and employees. If we did, we would know that, as 
discussed in detail infra,1 even without obtaining a public performance 
license,2 none of the first three stores are infringing on the composers’ 
copyrights. Each of these enterprises is allowed to play this radio-
broadcasted music based on a 1975 Supreme Court case and its 
subsequent codification in § 110(5)3 of the Copyright Act of 1976.4 This 
 1. See infra Part II. 
 2. 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (2012) (“[T]he owner of copyright under this title has the 
exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following: . . . (4) in the case of literary, 
musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and motion pictures and other 
audiovisual works, to perform the copyrighted work publicly.”). 
 3. 17 U.S.C. § 110(5) (2012). 
 4. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
1383-1450_LIEBESMAN_AUTHORPROOF 06032015 (DO NOT DELETE) 11/2/2015 9:35 PM 
1386 BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 30:2  
exemption was originally known as the Aiken Exemption,5 but is now 
commonly called the Homestyle Exemption.6 Things get murkier with the 
fourth and fifth stores: even though the technologies used in the latter two 
stores may commonly be found in a home, store owners using this new 
technology may fail to qualify for the Homestyle Exemption. The use of 
wireless technology may not give these latter two storeowners a defense to 
infringement of the public performance right, and the copyright owners of 
the musical compositions that are broadcast may have a cause of action 
against the latter two storeowners.7 This depends on whether courts will 
be construing the Copyright Act’s Homestyle Exemption in a “technology 
blind” manner. On the one hand, if the functional aspects of the devices 
used by an alleged infringer do matter, then the underlying technology 
involved in an infringement claim will be considered in a court’s analysis. 
Conversely, the Copyright statute could be interpreted in a “technology 
blind” manner, whereby courts ignore how a particular system actually 
operates, and instead interpret the statutory language without 
consideration to how the underlying technology functions. 
Determining if those two latter stereo systems also fall within the 
Homestyle Exemption illuminates the quandary created by the Supreme 
Court in American Broadcasting Cos. v. Aereo, Inc.:8 whether how the 
different wireless technologies operate should be taken into consideration. 
When the Homestyle Exemption to infringement of a copyright owner’s 
public performance right was first pronounced and later codified, the 
justices and legislators based the Exemption on the technology present at 
the time, which did not account for the future popularity of wireless 
receivers—or even their existence at the consumer electronic level. 
This Article argues that invoking “technology blindness” to resolve 
copyright issues—even when limited to those issues falling under the 
Transmit Clause—could result in a net harm. First, the Transmit Clause 
 5. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken (Aiken III), 422 U.S. 151 (1975). 
 6. See, e.g., On the Fairness in Musical Licensing Act of 1997: Hearing on H.R. 789 
Before the Subcomm. on Courts & Intellectual Prop. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 1 
(1997) (statement of Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights) (noting that the proposed 
bill would expand “the existing ‘homestyle’ exemption in section 110(5)”). This Article 
will use these terms interchangeably. 
 7. While direct copyright infringement liability—as well as secondary liability—
may extend to the owner of the shopping mall, this is a tangential to the topic of this 
Article, and will not be discussed herein. 
 8. Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014). 
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is rarely construed in a vacuum; the Homestyle Exemption is just one 
example where it is read in conjunction with another section of the 
Copyright Act. Second, when enacting these sections, Congress was clear 
that courts should examine the technology in use. While invoking 
technology blindness would help in the occasional situation where new 
technology might “look like” a form that falls within one of the Copyright 
Act’s exemptions, it will more likely inhibit innovation when the new 
technology superficially “looks like” one which requires a license. By 
ignoring situations where the underlying “behind the scenes” technology 
would otherwise fall within the Act, innovators would be paralyzed, 
unable to rely on work-arounds with no guarantee that courts would find 
their inventions to be noninfringing. One can almost always find—among 
many options—that to some non-technology savvy end users, an 
innovation “looks like” it is an infringing device. In other words, 
technology matters. 
As such, Part II of this Article provides the foundation and history 
behind the Homestyle Exemption to the public performance right, first 
through its pronouncement by the Supreme Court in Twentieth Century 
Music Corp. v. Aiken (Aiken III),9 and its later adoption, though based on a 
different rationale, by Congress in the Copyright Act of 1976.10 This Part 
also provides the “nuts and bolts” of how wired and wireless speaker 
systems operate and sets forth the test used in evaluating stereo systems 
under the Homestyle Exemption—a very technology-specific assessment. 
Part III applies the exemption to the three currently popular forms of 
wireless speaker technology, focusing on the multiple receivers and 
transmitters required for any wireless system. This Part also touches on the 
use of Internet radio as a source for performed content—yet another 
technological advancement not considered when the Homestyle 
Exemption was enacted. However, these earlier Parts are merely a prelude, 
providing background to a broader, more pertinent question: how far does 
the Supreme Court’s construction of “technology blindness” in Aereo go? 
Thus, the first three Parts form a bridge to Part IV, which addresses the 
concept of “technology blindness” and the recent Supreme Court decision, 
 9. See Aiken III, 422 U.S. at 162–64. The District Court decision, Twentieth 
Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 356 F. Supp. 271 (W.D. Pa. 1973), will be referred to as 
Aiken I, and the Third Circuit’s holding, Twentieth Century Fox Music Corp. v. Aiken, 500 
F.2d 127 (3d Cir. 1974), will be referred to as Aiken II. 
 10. See 17 U.S.C. § 110(5) (2012); see also H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 5700–01 
(1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659; infra Part II.B.2. 
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American Broadcasting Cos. v. Aereo, Inc.11 The Court’s reliance on the 
fallacy that Aereo’s system of antennas “resemble” a cable company’s 
transmission of a signal (and thus infringe on broadcasters’ copyright 
rights) is used to interpret the wireless speaker system as “resembling” a 
wired system, without examining the differences in the technologies. Part 
IV examines how this “technology blind” approach would affect 
application of the Homestyle Exemption. This Article then contends that 
“technology blindness” is the wrong approach, and discusses its 
detrimental consequences. Part V asserts the importance of analyzing the 
Copyright Act in relation to the underlying technology at issue. This 
Article concludes that interpreting statutes without considering the behind 
the scenes technological architecture of a potentially infringing product 
can inhibit innovation and adversely disrupt courts, innovators, and 
anyone who abhors vagueness and uncertainty in the rule of law. 
II. THE AIKEN/HOMESTYLE EXEMPTION: ITS ORIGINS, 
CODIFICATION, AND RELATION TO THE TRANSMIT 
CLAUSE 
Historically, as technological innovations provided a greater audience 
for works, copyright rights have been asserted more broadly as well. 
Gramophones, and later on radios, allowed those with no musical skills to 
hear great works performed by accomplished musicians in the privacy of 
their own homes. Yet copyright owners were unable to stop others from 
financially benefiting from this new access to their works—the technology 
at issue had not been conferred copyright rights under then-applicable 
copyright law. This is because in earlier versions of the Copyright Act, the 
types of works covered were specifically delineated, with the list amended 
from time to time in order to bring new technology within its purview.12
For example, in White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co.,13 the 
Supreme Court held that player piano rolls could not be “read” by a 
human, and thus those who produced “unauthorized” copies were not 
infringing on the music encoded in the rolls. Congress later remedied this 
 11. 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014). 
 12. For example, under the 1831 Act, only books, maps, charts, musical 
compositions, prints, cuts, and engravings were covered. An Act to Amend the Several 
Acts Respecting Copyrights, 4 Stat. 436 (1831). 
 13. 209 U.S. 1, 18 (1908). 
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in the 1909 Copyright Act by incorporating expanded language to cover 
mechanical performances.14
The Aiken (or Homestyle) Exemption is another example in the long 
history of technological advances at the heart of the enactment of a section 
in the Copyright Act. This exemption provides small businesses with a 
safe harbor by allowing them to broadcast music or a television program 
without infringing on the copyright owner’s public performance rights. 
While the Supreme Court’s rationale in Aiken III15 was rejected by 
Congress when the Copyright Act was revised, the exemption was 
nonetheless retained and codified in the 1976 Act, albeit on a different 
basis. Underlying this exemption was the increased availability of home 
listening devices and other technologies that brought music and dramatic 
entertainment out of theatres and public gatherings and into more diverse 
settings, such as stores, restaurants, and homes. 
This Part begins with an overview of the public performance right 
prior to 1976, then details the Homestyle Exemption delineated in the 
three Aiken decisions—how it was developed and the intent behind 
providing this limitation to a copyright owner’s public performance right. 
This Part then discusses its incorporation as the “Homestyle Exemption” 
into the Copyright Act of 1976, its relation to the “Transmit Clause” 
included in the definition of “public performance,” and the impact of 
statutory interpretations of rights versus exemptions. 
A. THE PUBLIC PERFORMANCE RIGHT BEFORE THE 1976 ACT
The public performance right was not among those originally granted 
in the first Copyright Act. The 1790 Act, as well as those preceding the 
1856 Amendments, only provided rights “to print, reprint, publish and 
vend,” and only for maps, charts, books, and books already printed.16
Congress first included public performance rights in copyrighted works in 
the 1856 Amendments—sixty-six years later—but only for dramatic 
works.17 These rights were expanded to include musical compositions in 
the Copyright Act of 1897.18
 14. Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, § 1(e), 35 Stat. 1075. 
 15. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken (Aiken III), 422 U.S. 151, 160 (1975) 
(holding that Aiken did not “perform” the copyrighted works within the meaning of the 
Act). 
 16. Copyright Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 124. In 1865, photographs were added to the list. 
Act of Mar. 3, 1865, 13 Stat. 540. 
 17. The Act read: 
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At the time of the Aiken litigation, the 1909 Act was in force, with § 1 
providing a public performance right for musical compositions.19 To 
enforce these rights, artists typically joined one of the musicians’ rights 
organizations such as the American Society of Composers, Authors and 
Publishers (ASCAP),20 Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI),21 Harry Fox Music 
Publishing,22 or Twentieth Century Music Corporation. These 
organizations in turn licensed the public performance right on behalf of 
artists, collected the license fees, and distributed the proceeds to the rights 
owners.23
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United 
States of American in Congress assembled, [t]hat any copyright 
hereafter granted under the laws of the United States to the author or 
proprietor of any dramatic composition, designed or suited for public 
representation, shall be deemed and taken to confer upon the said 
author or proprietor, his heirs or assigned, along with the sole right to 
print and publish the said composition, the sole right also to act, 
perform, or represent the same, or cause it to be acted, performed, or 
represented, on any stage or public place during the whole period for 
which the copyright is obtained. 
Act of Aug. 18, 1856, 11 Stat. 138. 
 18. Section 4966 of the 1897 Act provided that “[a]ny person publicly performing or 
representing any dramatic or musical composition for which a copyright has been 
obtained, without the consent of the proprietor of said dramatic or musical composition, 
or his heirs or assigns, shall be liable for damages therefor.” Act of Jan. 6, 1897, 29 Stat. 
481. 
 19. Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, § 1(e), 35 Stat. 1075 (“[A]ny 
person entitled thereto, upon complying with provisions of this Act, shall have the 
exclusive right: . . . (e) To perform the copyrighted work publicly for profit if it be a 
musical composition and for the purpose of public performance for profit.”). In the most 
recent iteration of federal copyright law, the Copyright Act of 1976, § 106 provides that 
the owner of a copyright in a musical work has the exclusive right to (or to authorize) the 
public performance of her copyrighted work. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012). 
 20. See THE AM. SOC’Y OF COMPOSERS, AUTHORS & PUBLISHERS, 
http://www.ascap.com (last visited Sept. 7, 2014). 
 21. See BROADCAST MUSIC, INC., http://www.bmi.com (last visited July 22, 2014). 
 22. See THE HARRY FOX AGENCY, http://www.harryfox.com (last visited Dec. 30, 
2014). 
 23. See, e.g., ASCAP Payment System: Introduction, ASCAP, http://www.ascap.com/
members/payment.aspx (last visited Sept. 7, 2014). For example, ASCAP members who 
subscribe to “ASCAP OnStage” receive payment “for live performances at venues of any 
size.” Id. ASCAP claims that through ASCAP OnStage composers can receive royalties 
when their music is performed live at venues of all sizes throughout the country. The 
composer provides the basic details of the performance and which songs were performed, 
and the artist will receive a payment for these live performances with their normal 
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Two Supreme Court opinions defining the limits of the public 
performance right under the 1909 Act were relevant to the Court’s Aiken
decision. First, in Buck v. Jewell-Lasalle Realty,24 decided in 1931, Gene 
Buck, the then-president of ASCAP, sued the owner of the La Salle 
Hotel in Kansas City, Missouri for infringement of its members’ public 
performance rights. The hotel had a radio receiver that was wired to 
speakers in both the hotel’s common areas and private rooms. Programs 
received on this central radio receiver could then “be simultaneously heard 
throughout the building.”25 The lower courts denied relief, “on the ground 
that [the hotel’s] acts did not constitute a ‘performance’ within the 
Copyright Act.”26 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that when the 
hotel proprietor made available to his guests, through a “radio receiving set 
and loud speakers installed in his hotel and under his control and for the 
entertainment of his guests, the hearing of a copyrighted musical 
composition which has been broadcast from a radio transmitting station, 
[it] constitute[d] a performance of such composition within the meaning 
of 17 U.S.C Sec. 1(e).”27 The Court applied what was dubbed a 
“quantitative test,”28 so named because of “the quantitative performance 
standard employed . . . which can be defined as: ‘How much did the 
infringer do to bring about the viewing and hearing of a copyrighted 
work?’”29
Thirty-five years later, the Supreme Court decided Fortnightly Corp. v. 
United Artists Television, Inc.,30 a case involving an infringement action 
against cable television operators who transmitted TV signals into homes. 
In the 1960s, Fortnightly Corporation owned and operated a cable 
television (CATV) system in rural West Virginia, where the hilly terrain 
prevented most of the areas’ residents from receiving over-the-air 
ASCAP distribution. ASCAP OnStage, ASCAP, http://www.ascap.com/
members/onstage.aspx (last visited Sept. 7, 2014). 
 24. Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191 (1931). 
 25. Id. at 195. 
 26. Id. (citing Buck v. Duncan, 32 F.2d 366 (W.D. Mo. 1929)). 
 27. Id. at 195–96. 
 28. Twentieth Century Fox Music Corp. v. Aiken (Aiken II), 500 F.2d 127, 133 (3d 
Cir. 1974). 
 29. Id. at 133 n.14 (quotations and citations omitted.); cf. id. at 137. 
 30. Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390 (1968). In 
Fortnightly, the Court held that broadcasters are the performers of television 
transmissions, and that neither cable television operators nor viewers are “performers” 
under the 1909 Act. Id. The cable television systems merely aided the viewer’s ability to 
receive the broadcasted signal. Id.
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television broadcasts via an ordinary rooftop antenna.31 To solve this 
problem, Fortnightly sold subscriptions to its system, which consisted “of 
antennas located on hills . . . with connecting coaxial cables, strung on 
utility poles, to carry the signals received by the antennas to the home 
television sets of individual subscribers.”32 United Artists Television sued 
for infringement of its public performance rights to its copyrighted works 
that were transmitted over Fortnightly’s system. The lower courts held in 
favor of United Artists.33 On a grant of certiorari, the Supreme Court 
reversed. First, the Court discussed the growth of technology since the 
law’s enactment, and how broadcasters and television viewers were 
analogized during the litigation. “Despite . . . deviations from the 
conventional situation contemplated by the framers of the Copyright Act 
[of 1909], broadcasters have been judicially treated as exhibitors, and 
viewers as members of a theater audience. Broadcasters perform. Viewers 
do not perform.”34 The Court, noting the lack of control CATV operators 
had over the programming they transmitted, reversed the lower courts, 
holding that CATV operators were more like viewers who did not 
perform the programs received.35 The Court concluded that cable 
television “systems do not in fact broadcast or rebroadcast and that ‘ . . . 
like viewers . . . do not perform the programs that they . . . carry.”36 In the 
Court’s view, neither the cable television operator nor the viewer was 
engaged in a public performance of the copyrighted work at issue. 
The Court based its decision on the functional nature of the 
equipment used, comparing it to features of equipment found in homes.37
Fortnightly’s “functional test” is one which asks if “the basic function the 
 31. Id. at 391. 
 32. Id. at 392. 
 33. United Artists Television, Inc. v. Fortnightly Corp., 255 F. Supp. 177 
(S.D.N.Y. 1966), aff’d, 377 F.2d 872 (2d Cir. 1967) rev’d, 392 U.S. 390 (1968). The 
Second Circuit, in reaching its decision, relied on the quantitative test outlined in Jewell-
LaSalle. Fortnightly, 392 U.S. at 396 (“The Court of Appeals thought that the controlling 
question in deciding whether the petitioner’s CATV systems ‘performed’ the copyrighted 
works was: ‘How much did the [petitioner] do to bring about the viewing and hearing of 
a copyrighted work?’” (alteration in original)). 
 34. Fortnightly, 392 U.S. at 398. 
 35. Id. at 400–01. 
 36. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken (Aiken I), 356 F. Supp. 271, 274 
(W.D. Pa. 1973) (citing Fortnightly, 392 U.S. at 400–01) (omissions in original). 
 37. Fortnightly, 392 U.S. at 406. 
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equipment serves is little different from that served by the equipment 
generally furnished by a television viewer.”38
Jewell-Lasalle and Fortnightly can be seen as early demonstrations of 
courts determining an infringement action could either based the 
underlying technology or viewed in a “technology blind” manner, with a 
rejection of “technology blindness” in favor of determining infringement 
based on the underlying technology. 
B. DEVELOPMENT AND CODIFICATION OF THE HOMESTYLE 
EXEMPTION
George Aiken’s attempt to provide radio-received music and news to 
his customers prompted the Court to decide whether Jewell-Lasalle or 
Fortnightly should control with regard to the public performance right and 
radio broadcasts in this setting. This Section first discusses Twentieth 
Century Fox v. Aiken,39 Aiken’s vindication by the Supreme Court; this 
resulted in the codification of an exemption for what would otherwise be 
infringing activities. Congress, however, rejected the Court’s view that 
store owners who provide broadcasted music for their customers (Aiken 
III), and cable television operators who transmit television broadcasts to 
viewers in homes (Fortnightly), were not “performing.” The addition of 
the “transmit” clause to the definition of the “public performance”40
solidified Congress’ rejection of the Court’s rationale. This Section ends 
with explorations of how the Homestyle Exemption is impacted by its tie 
to the Transmit Clause, and whether the exemption should be narrowly or 
broadly construed. 
1. Twentieth Century Fox Music Corporation v. Aiken 
In 1972, several musicians’ rights organizations sued George Aiken for 
failure to pay a public performance license.41 Aiken owned a chain of small 
take-out restaurants in the Pittsburgh area42 called “George Aiken’s 
Chicken.”43 Each restaurant had seating for about 40 people, though the 
majority of the restaurant customers ordered their meals “take-out.”44
 38. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken (Aiken II), 500 F.2d 127, 134 (3d Cir. 
1974) aff’d, 422 U.S. 151 (1975). 
 39. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken (Aiken III), 422 U.S. 151, 153 (1975). 
 40. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
 41. Aiken III, 422 U.S. at 153. 
 42. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken (Aiken I), 356 F. Supp. 271, 272 
(W.D. Pa. 1973). 
 43. Aiken III, 422 U.S. at 152. 
 44. Aiken I, 356 F. Supp. at 272. 
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Most of customers stayed in the restaurant for about 10–15 minutes.45 To 
give some “ambiance” to the establishment while clientele waited to pick 
up their order, Aiken installed a small transistor radio that was connected 
via wires to four speakers in the ceiling of the restaurant, from which 
customers and employees heard music and news from local radio 
stations.46
After a bench trial, Judge Weis found Aiken liable for infringing on 
the public performance rights of two copyright owners: Mary M. Bourne, 
the owner of “Me and My Shadow,” and Twentieth Century Music 
Corporation, the owner of the copyright to the musical composition of 
“The More I See You.”47 The District Court had to choose which of two 
competing Supreme Court decisions—Jewell-Lasalle Realty48 or 
Fortnightly49—was determinative.50 The District Court concluded that 
Aiken’s situation was more comparable to that of Jewell-Lasalle,51 a 
“technology blind” viewpoint. 
Aiken appealed to the Third Circuit, which overturned the District 
Court ruling.52 Since the 1909 Act did not define “performance” 
(something remedied in the 1976 Act),53 the plaintiffs had argued that 
Aiken had publicly performed the musical works “when he switched on his 
radio (with four loud speakers attached) and tuned to the station which 
was playing these compositions.”54 The Third Circuit, however, concluded 
that Aiken did not “perform” copyrighted musical compositions within the 
meaning of the 1909 Act.55 The appellate court reiterated Fortnightly’s
 45. Aiken III, 422 U.S. at 152. 
 46. Id.
 47. Aiken I, 356 F. Supp. at 272. On March 11, 1972, both of these songs were 
broadcasted on WKJF-FM, a radio station out of Pittsburgh, PA, and heard in Aiken’s 
restaurant. Id.
 48. Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191 (1931). 
 49. Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390 (1968). 
 50. Aiken I, 356 F. Supp. at 272. 
 51. Id. at 275. Damages of $250 for each infringement were assessed to Aiken. Id.
 52. Twentieth Century Fox Music Corp. v. Aiken (Aiken II), 500 F.2d 127 (3d Cir. 
1974) aff’d, 422 U.S. 151 (1975). 
 53. Id. at 130. (“The District Court recognized, as do we, that the Act itself does 
not define ‘performance.’”). 
 54. Id. The Third Circuit also noted that, as a matter of policy, ASCAP did “not 
require[] a license where the commercial establishment ha[d] limited itself to a radio and 
one speaker.” Id. at 129. 
 55. Id. at 137 (“We hold, therefore, that mere extension of the range of audibility of 
a broadcast program as ‘extended’ here by the appellant Aiken, cannot be said to 
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pronouncement that “[b]roadcasters perform. Viewers do not perform. 
Thus, while both broadcaster and viewer play crucial roles in the total 
television process, a line is drawn between them. One is treated as an 
active performer; the other, as passive beneficiary.”56
The Third Circuit was able to distinguish Jewell-LaSalle from the facts 
in Aiken by utilizing Fortnightly’s “functional” test.57 In addition, it rejected 
Jewell-LaSalle’s “quantitative test” based on quantifying the actions of the 
alleged infringer.58 In Jewell-LaSalle, the broadcast was sent out to the 
many rooms in the hotel via a commercial stereo system; in Aiken, the 
broadcast was limited to a single room via a system commonly found in 
homes.59
The Supreme Court affirmed the Third Circuit’s holding that viewers 
(or listeners) do not perform, but rather are merely passive beneficiaries of 
the performance.60 The Court did affirm its holding in Jewell-LaSalle, but 
found it factually distinguished from Aiken.61 In addition, “[a]s 
reinterpreted by the Aiken decision, the rule of Jewell-LaSalle applies only 
if the broadcast being re-transmitted was itself unlicensed.”62 The Court 
constitute a ‘performance.’” (footnote omitted)). The Supreme Court held that the 
purpose of the exclusive right to perform a copyrighted work publicly for profit under the 
1909 Act 
was to prohibit unauthorized performances of copyrighted musical 
compositions in such public places as concert halls, theatres, 
restaurants, and cabarets . . . . An orchestra or individual 
instrumentalist or singer who performs a copyrighted musical 
composition in such a public place without a license is thus clearly an 
infringer under the statute . . . . But it was never contemplated that the 
members of the audience who heard the composition would themselves 
also be simultaneously ‘performing’ and thus also guilty of 
infringement. 
Twentieth Century Fox Music Corp. v. Aiken (Aiken III), 422 U.S. 151, 157 (1975). 
 56. Aiken III, 422 U.S. at 161 (citing Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, 
Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 398–99 (1968)). 
 57. Aiken II, 500 F.2d at 134–135; Fortnightly, 392 U.S. at 398–99; Aiken III, 422 
U.S. at 161 (“Broadcasters perform. Viewers do not perform.”); see also supra, notes 30–38 
and accompanying text. 
 58. Aiken II, 500 F.2d at 133 n.14. For a brief description of Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle
and its overall relevance to the public performance right, see supra, notes 24–29 and 
accompanying text. 
 59. Cf. Aiken II, 500 F.2d at 137. 
 60. Aiken III, 422 U.S. at 161, 164. 
 61. Id. at 160 (“We may assume for present purposes that the Jewell-LaSalle
decision retains authoritative force in a factual situation like that in which it arose.”). 
 62. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 87 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 
5700–01. 
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found the language in Fortnightly regarding the listener/viewer as not 
“performing” to be dispositive,63 and emphasized that copyright does not 
grant its owner an absolute monopoly. “The Copyright Act [of 1909] does 
not give a copyright holder control over all uses of his copyrighted work. 
Instead, . . . the Act enumerates several ‘rights’ that are made ‘exclusive’ to 
the holder of the copyright.”64 Any use outside of these rights is not an 
infringing action.65
As exemplified by Aiken and its related cases, questions before the 
Court continually revolve around whether actions that utilize technology 
that was not yet contemplated when the Act was written constitute 
infringement. The technological advancements that occurred during the 
tenure of the 1909 Act are breathtaking. Radio, motion pictures, and 
television all came of age; the Court had to determine how copyright law 
would apply to—and thus regulate—these technologies:  
Although Congress did not revise the statutory language, 
copyright law was quick to adapt to prevent the exploitation of 
protected works through the new electronic technology . . . . It 
was soon established in the federal courts that the broadcast of a 
copyrighted musical composition by a commercial radio station 
was a public performance of that composition for profit—and 
thus an infringement of the copyright if not licensed.66
 63. Aiken III, 422 U.S. at 161 (“The language of the Court’s opinion in the 
Fortnightly case could hardly be more explicitly dispositive of the question now before 
us.”). 
 64. Id. at 154–55. 
 65. Id. at 155 (using the example of singing a copyrighted song in the shower as a 
noninfringing act that requires no license from the copyright owner). 
 66. Id. at 158. The Court continued: 
A performance, in our judgment, is no less public because the listeners 
are unable to communicate with one another, or are not assembled 
within an inclosure [sic], or gathered together in some open stadium or 
park or other public place. Nor can a performance, in our judgment, be 
deemed private because each listener may enjoy it alone in the privacy 
of his home. Radio broadcasting is intended to, and in fact does, reach 
a very much larger number of the public at the moment of the rendition 
than any other medium of performance. 
Id. at 158–59. 
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2. Codification into the Copyright Act of 1976 
When Congress revised U.S. copyright law via the 1976 Act, it 
codified the substance of the Aiken Exemption in § 110(5) as follows:67
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, the following are 
not infringements of copyright: except as provided in 
subparagraph (B), communication of a transmission embodying 
a performance or display of a work by the public reception of the 
transmission on a single receiving apparatus of a kind commonly 
used in private homes, unless (i) a direct charge is made to see or 
hear the transmission; or (ii) the transmission thus received is 
further transmitted to the public . . . .68
Congress was concerned with “rent seeking”69 by copyright owners, 
especially when actions like George Aiken’s were usually not subject to 
either royalties or litigation, and the copyright owners were already 
receiving value for their rights. Congress was also loath to turn the use of 
 67. Later renumbered § 110(5)(A). 
 68. 17 U.S.C. § 110(5)(A) (2012). Section 106 of the Act enumerates six rights 
afforded to copyright owners: the (1) reproduction, (2) adaptation, (3) distribution, (4) 
public performance, (5) public display, and (6) digital broadcasts of sound recordings. 
The public performance right does not apply to any copyright in sound recordings (nor 
does the public display right); however, § 106(4) does apply to the copyright in the 
underlying musical composition. Thus, to broadcast/transmit a song over the radio, a 
license is needed from the copyright owner in the musical composition, but not from the 
owner of the copyright in the sound recording. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012). 
 69. “Rent-seeking” can be defined “as the actions and decisions of political actors 
that result in wealth transfers which reduce the economic wellbeing of society.” Thomas 
M. Murray, The U.S.-French Dispute Over GATT Treatment of Audiovisual Products and 
the Limits of Public Choice Theory: How an Efficient Market Solution Was “Rent-Seeking,” 21 
MD. J. INT’L L. & TRADE 203, 203–04 (1997) (citing DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P.
FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE 34 (1991) (“When economists describe special 
interest legislation as ‘rent-seeking,’ they mean that the legislation is not justified on a 
cost-benefit basis: it costs the public more than it benefits the special interest, so society 
as a whole is worse off.”)). 
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an “ordinary receiver” into a potentially infringing act70 when there was no 
commercial advantage gained.71
The legislative history illustrates however, that while Congress agreed 
with the Supreme Court’s holding in Aiken, it rejected the Court’s 
rationale that Aiken, his customers, and his employees were passive 
listeners, and that Aiken’s broadcast did not constitute public 
performance.72 Instead, the legislature chose to declare that while such use 
 70. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 86 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 
5700. 
The basic rationale of this clause is that the secondary use of the 
transmission by turning on an ordinary receiver in public is so remote 
and minimal that no further liability should be imposed. In the vast 
majority of these cases no royalties are collected today, and the 
exemption should be made explicit in the statute. 
Id.
 71. John Wilk, Seeing the Words and Hearing the Music: Contradictions in the 
Construction of 17 U.S.C. Section 110(5), 45 RUTGERS L. REV. 783, 831 (1993). Mr. Wilk 
believes that 
[t]he legislative rationale of section 110(5) appears to be that, in some 
instances, commercial establishments were receiving commercial 
advantage from playing radio broadcasts and should, therefore, be 
subject to copyright infringement liability. The statutory and legislative 
factors of section 110(5) merely serve as a test to differentiate 
establishments that are receiving a commercial benefit from those that 
are not. 
Id. at 831. Yet it is debatable as to whether this blanket statement is always true. Retail 
stores like The Gap or Claire’s arguably attain no commercial advantage from playing 
music though a Homestyle-qualifying system versus a commercial system. For sports 
restaurants or bars, however, there may be a commercial advantage to using a professional 
sound system. Section 110(5)(B) seeks to differentiate between the types of business 
establishments and whether they qualify for the Exemption, but the underlying rationale 
remains what Wilk claims it is. 
 72. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 86–87 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
5659, 5700. 
The majority of the Supreme Court in the Aiken case based its decision 
on a narrow construction of the word ‘perform’ in the 1909 statute. 
This basis for the decision is completely overturned by the present bill 
and its broad definition of ‘perform’ in section 101. The Committee 
has adopted the language of section 110(5), with an amendment 
expressly denying the exemption in situations where ‘the performance 
or display is further transmitted beyond the place where the receiving 
apparatus is located’; in doing so, it accepts the traditional, pre-Aiken, 
interpretation by means other than a home receiving set, or further 
transmission of a broadcast to the public, is considered an infringing 
act. 
1383-1450_LIEBESMAN_AUTHORPROOF _06032015 (DO NOT DELETE) 11/2/2015 9:35 PM 
2015] AIKEN MEETS AEREO 1399 
was a public performance, the newly enacted § 110(5) exempted such 
public performances from infringing on the exclusive right held by the 
copyright owner.73
Congress also remedied the lack of a definition of “public 
performance” in the 1909 Act—the 1976 Act declares that a work is 
“performed publicly” when “it is at a place open to the public or at any 
place where a substantial number of persons outside of a normal circle of 
family and its social acquaintances is gathered, . . . [or a performance] 
transmit[ted] or otherwise communicate . . . to the public.”74 Thus, if 
there was no § 110(5) exemption, the performing of a musical work in a 
store or restaurant via a radio broadcast, without the permission of the 
copyright owner, would infringe on the copyright owner’s public 
performance right.75
Congress also made clear that this exemption applies to all 
performances—it removed the “for profit” language from the public 
performance right granted76 in the 1909 Act.77 When discussing the public 
Id. at 87. 
 73. 17 U.S.C. § 110(5)(A) (2012) (“Not withstanding the provisions of section 106, 
the following are not infringements of copyright: . . . communication of a transmission 
embodying a performance . . . of a work by the public reception of the transmission on a 
single receiving apparatus of a kind commonly used in private homes.”). 
 74. 17 U.S.C. § 101(1) (2012) (to perform or display a work “publicly”). Subsection 
(2) expands the definition of performing a work publicly to include the transmission of 
visual and audio signals, such as through radio and television broadcasts, as public 
performances. Specifically, it states: 
To perform . . . a work “publicly” means . . . (2) to transmit or 
otherwise communicate a performance . . . to the public, by means of 
any device or process, whether the members of the public capable of 
receiving the performance or display receive it in the same place or in 
separate places and at the same time or at different times. 
17 U.S.C. § 101(2). 
 75. 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (2012) (“[T]he owner of copyright under this title has the 
exclusive rights to do and to authorize the following: . . . in the case of literary, musical, 
dramatic and choreographic works, pantomimes, and motion pictures and other 
audiovisual works, to perform the copyrighted work publicly.”). 
 76. Compare 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (“[T]he owner of copyright under this title has the 
exclusive rights to do and to authorize . . . [anyone] to perform the copyrighted work 
publicly”), with Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, § 1, 35 Stat. 1075 (“[A]ny 
person entitled thereto, upon complying with the provisions of this Act, shall have the 
exclusive right . . . [t]o perform the copyrighted work publicly for profit if it be a musical 
composition and for the purpose of public performance for profit.” (emphasis added)). 
 77. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, 86 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 
5700. The statute notes that: 
Unlike the first four clauses of section 110, clause (5) is not to any 
extent a counterpart of the ‘for profit’ limitation of the present statute. 
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performance right with regard to the Homestyle Exemption, Congress 
focused on “reception in public.”78 Congress was equally clear in whom 
they viewed as the recipients of their largess through the Homestyle 
Exemption, and where they drew its limits: 
Under the particular fact situation in the Aiken case, assuming a 
small commercial establishment and the use of a home receiver 
with four ordinary loudspeakers grouped within a relatively 
narrow circumference from the set, it is intended that the 
performances would be exempt from clause (5). However, the 
Committee considers this fact situation to represent the outer 
limit of the exemption, and believes that the line should be 
drawn at that point. Thus, the clause would exempt small 
commercial establishments whose proprietors merely bring onto 
their premises standard radio or television equipment and turn it 
on for their customers’ enjoyment, but it would impose liability 
where the proprietor has a commercial “sound system” installed 
or converts a standard home receiving apparatus (by augmenting 
it with sophisticated or extensive amplification equipment) into 
the equivalent of a commercial sound system.79
Congress also rejected the safe harbor the Court gave to cable 
television operators80 in Fortnightly81 (and Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia 
Broadcasting System, Inc.).82 Section 110(5) did not provide an exemption 
It applies to performances and displays of all types of works, and its 
purpose is to exempt from copyright liability anyone who merely turns 
on, in a public place, an ordinary radio or television receiving apparatus 
of a kind commonly sold to members of the public for private use. 
Id.
 78. Id. The section of the report relating to the Homestyle Exemption is titled 
“Mere reception in public.” Id.
 79. Id. at 87, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5701. 
 80. As noted supra, the Court’s decisions in Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists 
Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390 (1968) and Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191 
(1931), distinguished between licensed and unlicensed transmissions to determine 
whether the recipient of the transmission was infringing on the copyright owner’s public 
performance right. 
 81. See 392 U.S. § 390 (1968). 
 82. See 415 U.S. § 394 (1974). 
When enacting Section 110(5), Congress noted that the Supreme 
Court based its decision in Aiken decision on two Supreme Court 
decisions dealing with cable television. In Fortnightly and again in 
Teleprompter, where the Court held “a CATV operator was not 
‘performing’ within the meaning of the 1909 statute, when it picked up 
broadcast signals off the air and retransmitted them to subscribers by 
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for cable television retransmissions (in rebuttal to the Supreme Court), 
and commercializing a retransmitted broadcast continued to be what 
defined an infringing act (affirming the Court).83 Congress did not, 
however—as illustrated by the technology-heavy language it used in 
creating the Homestyle Exemption—resort to a “technology blind” way of 
achieving this result. 
3. The Meaning of “Transmit” 
“Transmit” was not defined in the 1909 Act, and thus courts were left 
to define it, as well as to decide who transmitted and thus publicly 
performed a copyrighted work.84 In the 1976 Act, Congress remedied this 
omission: “[t]o ‘transmit’ a performance . . . is to communicate it by any 
cable.” The Aiken decision extends this interpretation of the scope of 
the 1909 statute’s right of ‘public performance for profit’ to a 
stipulation outside the CATV context and, without expressly overruling 
the decision in Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191 (1931), 
effectively deprives it of much meaning under the present law. For 
more than forty years the Jewell-LaSalle rule was thought to require a 
business establishment to obtain copyright licenses before it could 
legally pick up any broadcasts off the air and retransmit them to its 
guests and patrons. 
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 86–87 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5700–
01. 
 83. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 86 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 
5700 (stating that the Homestyle Exemption had “nothing to do with cable television 
systems and the exemptions would be denied in any case where the audience is charged 
directly to see or hear the transmission”). It should also be noted that the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) has concluded that the Homestyle Exemption is in violation of 
Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs), an international treaty of 
which the United States is a signatory. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the 
World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994). A 
WTO panel found that § 110(5), as amended by the FMLA 1998, was incompatible 
with Article 11bis(1)(iii) of the Berne Convention because it failed to meet the 
requirements of Article 11bis(2) of that Convention. Put differently, “since Section 
110(5) did not provide authors and composers with at least an equitable remuneration, it 
was in breach of Article 11bis as incorporated in the TRIPs Agreement.” See Makeen F. 
Makeen, The Reception in Public Dilemma Under U.S. Copyright Law, 58 J. COPYRIGHT 
SOC’Y U.S. 355, 395–418 (2011) (citing First Oral Statement of the European 
Communities, United States—Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act, para. 51, WT/DS 
160/R (Nov. 8, 1999); First Written Submission of the European Communities, United 
States—Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act, ¶ 77, WT/DS 160/R (Oct. 5, 1999)). Prof. 
Makeen’s article provides an in-depth analysis of the WTO’s conclusions regarding how 
the Homestyle Exemption violates TRIPs. 
 84. Radio telegraphy was in its infancy, with only extremely limited, experimental 
use. See, e.g., Invention of Radio, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Invention
_of_radio#Wireless_Telegraphy_2 (last visited Apr. 10, 2015). 
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device or process whereby images or sounds are received beyond the place 
from which they are sent.”85 Yet there are several relevant questions that 
still need to be addressed with regard to the Transmit Clause. First, while 
it appears to be facially “technology neutral,” (that is, it contains no 
technology-specific language) the clause is rarely read in a vacuum, but 
rather is read in conjunction with another section of the 1976 Act that 
may be reliant on technology, such as the technology-dependent 
Homestyle Exemption. Second, it is necessary to determine whether 
“transmit” requires that the sound recording’s signal actually be received 
and performed elsewhere, or whether merely “making the signal available” 
satisfies the definition. Must there be an actual “third party” 
recipient/broadcaster of the signal sent through the storeowner’s wireless 
speaker system? Some guidance may be found in recent court 
interpretations of the Transmit Clause to include the potential audience 
for a performance, not merely the actual audience. In Cartoon Network LP 
v. CSC Holdings, Inc. (aka Cablevision),86 the Second Circuit held that the 
Transmit Clause required a court “to discern who is ‘capable of receiving’ 
the performance being transmitted” when “determining whether a 
transmission is made to the public.”87
In that decision, CSC Holdings (“Cablevision”) was the operator of a 
cable television system that allowed its customers to remotely record TV 
programs using a device called a Remote-Storage DVR (RS-DVR).88 For 
customers who did not have stand-alone VCRs or DVD/DVR players,89
this device allowed viewers to record programs in the same manner that 
these home devices did,90 only at a remote location.91 Various copyright 
 85. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
 86. Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc. (Cablevision), 536 F.3d 121 (2d 
Cir. 2008). 
 87. Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FilmOn X L.L.C., 966 F. Supp. 2d 30, 38 
(D.D.C. 2013) (citing Cablevision, 536 F.3d at 134–35 (2d Cir. 2008)). 
 88. Cablevision, 536 F.3d at 124 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 89. Indeed, by the time Cablevision launched its RS-DVR service, “many cable 
companies . . . already offered their customers set-top boxes that added DVR 
functionality to their subscriptions, and none had been sued for doing so.” Rebecca 
Giblin & Jane C. Ginsburg, We Need to Talk about Aereo: Copyright-Avoiding Business 
Models, Cloud Storage and a Principled Reading of the “Transmit” Clause 8 (Columbia Law 
& Economics Working Paper Grp., Paper No. 480, 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn
.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2443595. 
 90. Recording programs on a VCR had already been found to be a noninfringing 
use. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
 91. Cablevision, 536 F.3d at 124. 
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owners sued Cablevision for infringement of their public performance 
rights, claiming that this RS-DVR would “directly infringe their exclusive 
rights to both reproduce and publicly perform their copyrighted works.”92
The Second Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary 
judgment against Cablevision, holding that under Sony v. Universal 
Pictures,93 as well as National Football League v. PrimeTime 24 Joint 
Venture,94 Cablevision’s device did not directly infringe.95 Included in the 
court’s rationale96 was its conclusion that Cablevision’s device did not 
directly infringe97 because it was not publicly performing the copyrighted 
works; its conduct did not meet the definition of “transmit to the public” 
under the 1976 Act because “the RS-DVR playback . . . does not involve 
the transmission of a performance ‘to the public.’”98 The court focused on 
determining who constituted the “potential audience” of a given 
transmission by an alleged infringer in order to evaluate whether the 
transmission was “to the public.”99 It held that “because the RS-DVR 
system, as designed, only makes transmissions to one subscriber using a 
copy made by that subscriber . . . the universe of people capable of 
receiving an RS-DVR transmission is the single subscriber whose self-
made copy is used to create that transmission.”100 Cablevision’s activities 
therefore did not constitute a public performance.101
With regard to who constitutes the “potential audience” of a 
performance, there is very little guidance present in the case law or by 
Congress. One option is to look to the distribution right and how courts 
 92. Id.
 93. 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
 94. 211 F.3d 10 (2d Cir. 2000). 
 95. Cablevision, 536 F.3d at 123, 140. 
 96. The court also provided a lengthy discussion regarding “volitional conduct”—
that despite copyright infringement’s strict liability standard, “there should still be some 
element of volition of causation”—it was the individual customer directing the recording 
and subsequent playback. Id. at 130. 
 97. Cablevision, 536 F.3d at 140. 
 98. Id. at 536 F.3d at 134–135 (“[E]ach RS-DVR transmission is made using a 
single unique copy of a work, made by an individual subscriber, one that can be decoded 
exclusively by that subscriber’s cable box, only one subscriber is capable of receiving any 
given RS-DVR transmission.”). 
 99. Id. at 137. 
 100. Id.
 101. Id. at 138 (“Given that each RS-DVR transmission is made to a given subscriber 
using a copy made by that subscriber, we conclude that such a transmission is not ‘to the 
public.’”). 
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have construed the “making available” right,102 though there is a split in 
the circuits. A court trying to analogize to “making available” could follow 
the Fourth and Second Circuits, which hold that making a copy available 
to the public is a public distribution, even if there is no evidence of 
someone actually receiving, requesting, or looking at the work.103
Alternatively, courts in the First, Ninth and Eighth Circuits hold that 
making an offer to distribute does not qualify as a distribution.104 Thus, 
using this latter rationale, a court could find that an actual transmission 
and infringing broadcast to an audience is required for there to be 
infringement, rather than merely making the transmission “available,” or 
could find the opposite. 
4. Construing Exemptions 
While the link between the Transmit Clause and the Homestyle 
Exemption supports the argument that technology matters, any exemption 
from copyright infringement may also be limited based on statutory 
construction. Thus, how courts generally construe the statutory language 
of § 110(5) has a profound effect on whether a wireless speaker system 
falls within the Homestyle Exemption. The courts and Congress have 
provided some guidance beyond the general adage that rights should be 
construed broadly, and exemptions should be construed narrowly, as 
exemplified in Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus:  
[C]opyright statutes ought to be reasonably construed, with a 
view to effecting the purposes intended by Congress. They ought 
not to be unduly extended by judicial construction to include 
privileges not intended to be conferred, nor so narrowly 
construed as to deprive those entitled to their benefit of the 
rights Congress intended to grant.105
 102. 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (2012) (“The owner of copyright under this title has the 
exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following: . . . to distribute copies . . . of 
the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, 
lease, or lending.”). 
 103. See Hotaling v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 118 F.3d 199, 201 
(4th Cir. 1997); Elektra Entm’t Grp., Inc. v. Barker, 551 F. Supp. 2d 234 (S.D.N.Y. 
2008). 
 104. See London-Sire Records, Inc. v. Doe 1, 542 F. Supp. 2d 153 (D. Mass. 2008); 
Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007); Capitol Records, 
Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210 (D. Minn. 2008). 
 105. Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Strauss, 210 U.S. 339, 346 (1908). 
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Congress emphatically delineated the Homestyle Exemption’s outer limit, 
consigning the further determination of its boundaries to the judiciary.106
In addition, there is ample evidence that courts already narrowly construe 
the statutory exceptions to a copyright owner’s rights. For example, in 
Brilliance Audio, Inc. v. Haights Cross Communications, Inc., the Sixth 
Circuit construed the first sale doctrine narrowly with regard to sound 
recordings of musical works.107 The Ninth Circuit has declared that the 
computer program exception under “Section 117 [of the Copyright Act] 
defines a narrow category of copying that is lawful per se.”108 And the 
Eleventh Circuit has held the § 119 exception enacted through the 
Satellite Home Viewer Act to be a narrow exception.109
 106. See supra notes 79–83 and accompanying text. 
 107. See Brilliance Audio, Inc. v. Haights Cross Commc’ns, Inc., 474 F.3d 365, 374 
(6th Cir. 2007). 
Thus, § 109(b)(1)(A) is best read as providing only a limited exception 
to the first-sale doctrine for sound recordings of musical works. When 
considered with the legislative history and the policy rationales 
underlying the Copyright Act, Congress’s use of the phrase “and in the 
musical works embodied therein” limits the statute’s application to only 
those sound recordings that contain musical works. The language of 
the statute does not unambiguously apply to audiobooks, and we have 
found no evidence that it should be so construed. 
Id.; see also A&M Records, Inc. v. A.L.W., Ltd., 855 F.2d 368, 369 (7th Cir. 1988) 
(“Congress passed the Record Rental Amendment in 1984 as a narrow exception to the 
‘first sale doctrine,’ which limits a copyright owner’s exclusive right to distribute his 
copyrighted material to his first sale of that material.”). 
 108. See Sega Enters., Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1521 (9th Cir. 1992). 
The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the United States District Court 
for the Northern District of California, in a case involving the copying of a computer 
program. The lower court stated that § 117 was a narrow exception, a finding of law that 
was affirmed—albeit briefly—by the appellate court. 
Section 117 allows an owner of a program to make a copy where the 
copy is an essential step in the utilization of the computer program in 
conjunction with a machine and it is used in no other manner. This 
narrow exception to the copyright act allows an owner of a program to 
load it into his computer for use, which involves making a copy in the 
machine memory. 
Sega Enters., Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 785 F. Supp. 1392, 1399 (N.D. Cal. 1992) 
(quotations and citations omitted), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 
1992). 
 109. See CBS, Inc. v. EchoStar Commc’n Corp., 265 F.3d 1193, 1209 (11th Cir. 
2001) (holding that the Satellite Home Viewer Act “creates a narrow exception to the 
generally applicable, and constitutional, Copyright Act”). Other narrowly construed 
exceptions include the implied license as a defense to copyright infringement. See
McIntosh v. N. Cal. Universal Enters. Co., 670 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1090 (E.D. Cal. 
2009) (“A ‘narrow exception to the writing requirement’ is an implied nonexclusive 
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Conversely, Congress’s vagueness in drafting § 110(5) could support 
the argument that this section should be construed in a slightly broader 
manner; its “[l]egislative history is a proper guide in interpreting the 
somewhat ambiguous notion of a home-type system”110 that qualifies for 
the exemption. After all, Congress began its report on the 1976 Act by 
observing that 
significant changes in technology have affected the operation of 
the copyright law. Motion pictures and sound recordings had 
just made their appearance in 1909, and radio and television 
were still in the early stages of their development. During the 
past half century a wide range of new techniques for capturing 
and communicating printed matter, visual images, and recorded 
sounds have come into use, and the increasing use of information 
storage and retrieval devices, communications satellites, and laser 
technology promises even greater changes in the near future. The 
technical advances have generated new industries and new 
methods for the reproduction and dissemination of copyrighted 
works, and the business relations between authors and users have 
evolved new patterns.111
Thus, while the “outer boundary” language in the legislative history 
supports a narrowly defined construction of the Homestyle Exception, this 
license to use the copyrighted work.” (quoting Effects Assocs., Inc. v. Cohen, 908 F.2d 
555, 558–559 (9th Cir. 1990)). 
 110. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Claire’s Boutiques, Inc., 949 F.2d 1482, 1493 (7th Cir. 
1991). 
 111. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 47 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 
5660 (indicating that in determining what would be copyrightable in the future, Congress 
purposely chose broad language to encompass future mediums of expression with 
copyrightability of original works of authorship). 
Authors are continually finding new ways of expressing themselves, but 
it is impossible to foresee the forms that these new expressive methods 
will take. The bill does not intend either to freeze the scope of 
copyrightable subject matter at the present stage of communications 
technology or to allow unlimited expansion into areas completely 
outside the present congressional intent. Section 102 implies neither 
that that subject matter is unlimited nor that new forms of expression 
within that general area of subject matter would necessarily be 
unprotected. The historic expansion of copyright has also applied to 
forms of expression which, although in existence for generations or 
centuries, have only gradually come to be recognized as creative and 
worthy of protection. 
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 51–52 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5665–
64. 
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same legislative history also provides support for broadly construing 
§ 110(5) to encompass technologies not anticipated at the time of its 
enactment.112
C. THE WIRED SPEAKER SYSTEM ORIGINALLY ENVISIONED
When Congress codified the Aiken Exemption into § 110(5) of the 
Copyright Act, the stereo system envisioned consisted of a radio receiver 
connected via wires to one or more speakers, either contained within the 
radio or attached to the radio receiver. 
Figure 1: Basic Diagram of a Radio Receiver with Wired Speakers113
In this system depicted in Figure 1, when the signal broadcasted from 
the radio station reaches a radio receiver, it converts the signal into an 
electrical impulse.114 The receiver then sends this electrical impulse 
through an internal or external wire to the speaker or speakers. Finally, the 
speakers translate the electrical impulse into pulses that vibrate the 
speaker’s woofer and tweeter, creating the sound we hear. 
 112. In its legislative history, Congress was cognizant that unanticipated future 
technologies could be used to create copyrighted works, and did not want to constantly 
have to revisit the Act to expand what kinds of works should be covered. 
 113. Adapted from U.S. Patent Application Serial No. 2008/0137879A1 fig. 1 (filed 
April 24, 2006). 
 114. Tom Harris, How Speakers Work, HOW STUFF WORKS, http://electronics
.howstuffworks.com/speaker5.htm (last visited Nov. 23, 2014). 
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D. DIY: HOOKING UP WIRELESS SPEAKERS TO YOUR HOME 
STEREO
As illustrated in Figure 2, a wireless speaker system consists of a 
transmitter that attaches to (or is part of) the radio receiver and wireless 
speakers. The wireless speakers are essentially combination radio 
receivers/speaker units. Rather than receiving the audio signal through 
audio cables like wired speakers, wireless speakers receive the audio signal 
through either open radio waves, a “Bluetooth” dedicated signal, or a 
wireless Ethernet system (e.g., Wi-Fi).115 The speakers then translate the 
signal into sound. “Wireless” refers to the lack of a wire that sends sound 
from the stereo receiver to the speaker, not a lack of all wires. Thus, while 
some wireless speakers have cords connecting the speaker to an electrical 
outlet (other speaker types are powered by batteries), these are still called 
“wireless.”116
Figure 2: Basic Diagram of a Radio Receiver with wireless speakers117
Some newer audio receivers have built-in transmitters, while older 
models may be modified for wireless speakers by attaching a transmitter to 
 115. Your Guide to Buying Wireless Home Theater Speakers, EBAY (June 9, 2014), 
http://www.ebay.com/gds/Your-Guide-to-Buying-Wireless-Home-Theater-Speakers-/
10000000177632035/g.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2015). 
 116. Id.
 117. Adapted from U.S. Patent Application Serial No. 20080137879A1200/801378
79A1 fig. 1 (filed April 24, 2006). 
1383-1450_LIEBESMAN_AUTHORPROOF _06032015 (DO NOT DELETE) 11/2/2015 9:35 PM 
2015] AIKEN MEETS AEREO 1409 
the audio receiver. All wireless speakers contain built-in receivers that pick 
up the signal sent by the wireless transmitter. As discussed infra, 
deciphering what Congress meant with regard to both “receiving 
apparatus” and “further transmission” has a direct effect on whether a 
wireless speaker system falls within the Homestyle Exemption. These 
required features must be examined not in the abstract, but with regard to 
the specific technology used in each of the three types of wireless speaker 
systems. 
E. THE THREE ELEMENTS OF THE CURRENT AIKEN/HOMESTYLE 
EXEMPTION TEST
As previously stated, Congress intended to “exempt small commercial 
establishments whose proprietors merely bring onto their premises 
standard radio or television equipment and turn it on for their customers’ 
enjoyment.”118 To successfully claim the § 110(5) exemption, courts 
require defendants to satisfy three technology-specific elements.119 First 
their system “must be of a kind commonly used in private homes.”120
 118. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 87–88 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
5659, 5700–01. 
 119. See Hickory Grove Music v. Andrews, 749 F. Supp. 1031, 1037 (D. Mont. 
1990) (“[D]efendants carry the burden of proving that their restaurant falls within the 
framework of the § 110(5) exemption.”). 
 120. See id. (citing Int’l Korwin Corp. v. Kowalczyk, 855 F.2d. 375, 378 (7th Cir. 
1988)). Through the enactment of the Fairness in Music Licensing Act (FIMLA) of 
1998, § 110(5)(B) was added, and the former § 110(5) was recodified as § 110(5)(A). 
This new section was an attempt to expand and clarify the limits on the size of the 
eating/drinking establishment and the number of speakers and/or televisions that can be 
used based on the business’s physical size. Section 110(5)(B) did not repeal the original 
Homestyle Exemption. 
Rather, it add[ed] a new and additional exemption for performances of 
nondramatic musical works that is based not on the use of “homestyle” 
receiving equipment but rather on the size of the establishment and the 
number of speakers or television sets used to transmit the music. The 
FIMLA grants a blanket licensing exemption to retail establishments 
that are smaller than 2000 square feet and to food service or drinking 
establishments that are smaller than 3750 square feet. 
Lawrence R. Helfer, World Music on a U.S. Stage: A Berne/TRIPs and Economic Analysis of 
the Fairness in Music Licensing Act, 80 B.U. L. REV. 93, 97 (2000). Section 110(5)(B) 
retains the proviso of “no transmission” of Section 110(5)(A). 17 U.S.C. § 110(5)(B)(iv) 
(2012). It states: 
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, the following are not 
infringements of copyright: . . . communication by an establishment of 
a transmission or retransmission embodying a performance or display of 
a nondramatic musical work intended to be received by the general 
public, originated by a radio or television broadcast station licensed as 
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Second, it must have only a single receiving apparatus.121 And third, the 
performances cannot “be ‘further transmitted’ to the public.”122
1. The First Element: Commonly Found in a Home 
The first element—that the system “must be of a kind commonly used 
in private homes”123—has a dynamic demarcation line that moves with the 
state of the contemporary technology as innovations transition from 
commercial to home use. Congress attempted to provide courts with the 
following guidance: 
Factors to consider . . . include the size, physical arrangement, 
and noise level of the areas within the establishment where the 
transmissions are made audible or visible, and the extent to 
which the receiving apparatus is altered or augmented for the 
purpose of improving the aural or visual quality of the 
performance for individual members of the public using those 
areas.124
Congress clearly anticipated that courts would, and should, examine 
the technology at issue when making a determination regarding the 
Homestyle Exemption.125 Scholars have also noted Congress’s awareness 
of this issue when it first proposed the exemption, and its refusal to 
address those who raised concerns that technological advances might 
undermine the protection based on the “homestyle receiving apparatus” 
language.126 The witnesses at the congressional hearings expressed concern 
that defining an exemption “in terms of a technological norm will fail to 
such by the Federal Communications Commission, or, if an audiovisual 
transmission, by a cable system or satellite carrier, if . . . the 
transmission or retransmission is not further transmitted beyond the 
establishment where it is received. 
Id. The intricacies of § 110(5)(B) are not pertinent to the focus of this Article. For 
further information regarding § 110(5)(B), see Helfer, supra. 
 121. Hickory Grove Music, 749 F. Supp. at 1037 (citing Int’l Korwin Corp. v. 
Kowalczyk, 855 F.2d. 375, 378 (7th Cir. 1988)). 
 122. See id.
 123. See id.
 124. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 87 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 
5701. 
 125. See Wilk, supra note 71, at 785 (noting that “the standard is not stable, as 
advances in technology continually redefine the parameters of the homestyle equipment 
standard”). 
 126. Id. at 839–40 (citing Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on H.R. 4347, 5680, 
6831, 6835 Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong. (1965)). 
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reflect the changes in that norm.”127 The legislative history128 and use of 
the phrase in the 1976 Act “now known or later developed”129 also 
intimates that Congress anticipated new technologies. This language in 
the 1976 Act has already allowed new technologies to be considered 
“tangible mediums of expression” without an act of Congress, unlike what 
was required to encompass new technologies under earlier versions of the 
Act. 
Since Congress was highly cognizant of technological advancement 
and its effect on the proliferation of copyrightable subject matter, arguably 
the interpretation of § 110(5) should also expand to encompass new 
technologies based on their proliferation in residences. Indeed, historical 
applications of the Homestyle Exemption demonstrate that, as 
commercial uses found their way into homes, courts adjusted their 
holdings accordingly. Appellate courts, when weighing in on a § 110(5) 
exemption, are already keen as to whether the system installed in the 
business had been altered from a common residential/home system to a 
more commercial one. A “company may not claim the exemption if it 
configures and uses home-type components in a manner not commonly 
found in a home.”130
For example, in Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Claire’s Boutiques, when 
considering whether the receiving apparatus was one “commonly used in 
private homes,” the Seventh Circuit examined whether “the company 
use[d] any non-home-type components in its stereo system” because such 
use would render the system “not home-type.”131 The appellate court 
opined that in determining whether a home-style receiving apparatus has 
 127. Id. (citing Copyright Law Revision: Hearings on H.R. 4347, 5680, 6831, 6835 
Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong. (1965); David E. 
Shipley, Copyright Law and Your Neighborhood Bar and Grill: Recent Developments in 
Performance Rights and the Section 110(5) Exemption, 29 ARIZ. L. REV. 475, 481 (1987)). 
The congressional witnesses, however, viewed the exemption from the opposite side: that 
“establishments currently using commercial equipment and paying licensing fees will 
gradually become exempt as technological advances enable them to make use of 
homestyle equipment.” Id.
 128. See infra note 79 and accompanying text. 
 129. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012) (“Copyright protection subsists . . . in original works 
of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, 
from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either 
directly or with the aid of a machine or device.” (emphasis added)). 
 130. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Claire’s Boutiques, 949 F.2d 1482, 1493 (7th Cir. 
1991) (citing Hickory Grove Music v. Andrews, 749 F. Supp. 1031, 1037 (D. Mont. 
1990)). 
 131. Id. at 1493. 
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been adapted into one for commercial use, the court needed to examine 
the system and whether it was equipped with additional components that 
expanded the receiver’s normal capabilities.132
In Claire’s, the court analyzed a system where the receiver was located 
in the back room of each of the defendant’s stores, with wires connecting 
it to speakers on the sales floor.133 At issue was whether the receiving 
apparatus used in each of the Claire’s shops was one “commonly used in 
private homes.”134 The court examined whether “the company use[d] any 
non-home-type components in its stereo system,” or augmented a 
homestyle stereo system135 because such use would render the system “not 
home-type.”136 A determination on these facts would be dispositive to the 
court’s holding because a company “may not claim the exemption if it 
configures and uses home-type components in a manner not commonly 
found in a home.”137 Based on the facts presented, the appellate court 
affirmed the lower court’s finding that the defendant’s systems used in the 
stores fell within the Homestyle Exemption.138
There are also many examples of different courts reaching opposite 
conclusions about the same technology. In 1988, when in-wall speaker 
wires were not commonly found in homes, Judge Prado in the Western 
District of Texas found that having in-wall wiring for speakers and 
locating the stereo receiver in a separate room was “commercial in 
nature.”139 Yet, in 1991, the internal wiring used in the Claire’s Boutiques 
 132. Id. at 1495. 
 133. Id.
 134. Id at 1492–94. 
 135. See Sailor Music v. Gap Stores, Inc., 516 F. Supp. 923 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), aff’d, 
668 F.2d. 84 (2d Cir. 1981). In Sailor Music, the district court found that the defendant’s 
stores were very big—over 3500 square feet—and thus were not the “small commercial 
establishment” envisioned by Congress. The court further found that the stores had 
augmented the homestyle stereo system to accommodate the large size, converting them 
“into the equivalent of a commercial sound system,” thus failing two of the three elements 
required for a successful Aiken Exemption defense. Id.
 136. Broadcast Music, 949 F.2d at 1493. 
 137. Id. (citing Hickory Grove Music v. Andrews, 749 F. Supp. 1031, 1037 (D. 
Mont. 1990)). 
 138. Id. at 1495. 
 139. Merrill v. Bill Miller’s Bar-B-Q Enters., Inc., 688 F. Supp. 1172, 1175 (W.D. 
Tex. 1988); see also Hickory Grove, 749 F. Supp. at 1038. Twenty-five years ago, courts 
determined that “recessed ceiling speakers attached to a receiving apparatus by a 
substantial length of hidden wiring do not constitute ‘home-type’ systems.” Hickory 
Grove, 749 F. Supp. at 1038 (citing Int’l Korwin Corp. v. Kowalczyck, 855 F.2d 375, 378 
(7th Cir. 1988)). Yet today, these setups are commonly found in residences, and are often 
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stores was afforded “minimal weight.”140 The court reasoned that, while 
such wired systems might not be prevalent in homes,141 the system bore a 
striking resemblance to the four speakers installed by Aiken, which 
Congress declared as the “outer limit.”142 Courts have been dynamic in 
their holdings as specific technological advancements become more widely 
available; there is ample evidence that they do not maintain a static view of 
technology’s proliferation from commercial settings to home use. 
Today, because many homes contain internally wired stereo systems—
often installed during the home’s construction—a store’s in-wall stereo 
wires would likely fall within the Exemption. Just as high-quality, digital, 
single-lens reflex cameras (now so easy to use that even a monkey can take 
great “selfies”143) and flat screen televisions formerly were out of reach for 
most consumers, their now-widespread adoption has moved them from 
“business only” to general use. Likewise, internally wired speaker systems 
and high-end digital receivers now fall under the Homestyle Exemption’s 
umbrella. 
installed while a home is being built. See, e.g., Running the Wires for Structured Wiring, 
STRUCTURED HOME WIRING, http://www.structuredhomewiring.com/Structured
Wiring.aspx (last visited Nov. 23, 2014). 
 140. Broadcast Music, 949 F.2d at 1494. 
 141. Id. It seems that in the 1990s, people living in the Seventh Circuit were more 
likely to have familiarity with these stereo systems than people living in Montana. 
 142. Id. The Seventh Circuit also noted that “if Congress wanted the rule to be that 
the receiver must be in the same room as the speaker for the exemption to apply, it could 
have easily said so.” Id. at 1495. 
 143. Jordan Weissmann, If a Monkey Takes a Selfie, Who Owns the Copyright?, SLATE
(Aug. 6, 2014), http://www.slate.com/blogs/moneybox/2014/08/06/monkey_selfie_who
_owns_the_copyright.html (last visited Aug. 31, 2014). In its recently released, updated 
Compendium draft, the Copyright Office responded to this query: 
The copyright law only protects “the fruits of intellectual labor” that 
“are founded in the creative powers of the mind.” Because copyright 
law is limited to “original intellectual conceptions of the author,” the 
Office will refuse to register a claim if it determines that a human being 
did not create the work . . . . The Office will not register works 
produced by nature, animals, or plants. Likewise, the Office cannot 
register a work purportedly created by divine or supernatural beings, 
although the Office may register a work where the application or the 
deposit copy(ies) state that the work was inspired by a divine spirit. 
U.S. Copyright Office, § 306 The Human Authorship Requirement, in COMPENDIUM OF 
U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES 54 (public draft Aug. 19, 2014) (citations 
omitted), available at http://copyright.gov/comp3/docs/compendium.pdf; U.S. Copyright 
Office, § 313.2 Works That Lack Human Authorship, in COMPENDIUM OF U.S.
COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES 54 (public draft Aug. 19, 2014) (citations omitted), 
available at http://copyright.gov/comp3/docs/compendium-full.pdf. 
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Similarly, while once rare, wireless receiver/audio/stereo systems are 
now very common in homes. All of the major audio manufacturers and 
distributors extensively market wireless speakers (some of which are made 
to adapt existing wired systems), as well as entire home entertainment 
systems that rely exclusively on wireless speakers.144 That there are 
currently three separate forms of technology in competition in the wireless 
stereo market is itself an indication of their growth and adoption by 
audiophile consumers. Some contemporary receiving apparatuses have 
built-in transmitters for use with compatible wireless speakers and are 
commonly sold for home use.145 Other wireless speaker systems have been 
developed to adapt to a standard stereo receiver using a transmitter 
attached to the receiver, which then transmits the signal to the speakers.146
One should question whether it matters if the system is added to an older 
receiver or if it is integrated. Or is this the wrong inquiry—should the 
threshold instead be whether the device is available and commonly used by 
consumers? 
Thus, the movement of technology from purely commercial settings 
into homes is of utmost importance when evaluating a stereo system for 
compliance with the Homestyle Exemption. To be blind to either 
technological advancement or its proliferation would be a mistake for any 
court when issuing a finding of fact or conclusion at law with regard to a 
§ 110(5) defense. While some systems would fit within this element’s 
Aiken safe harbor,147 there is still the matter of the explicit language in the 
statute regarding a “single receiving apparatus” and the prohibition on 
“retransmission” beyond what courts have allowed—that is, allowing the 
receiver and speakers to be located in adjoining rooms, connected via in-
wall wires. 
 144. See, e.g., Press Release, Sonos, Introducing the Sonos PLAY:1 (Oct. 14, 2013), 
available at http://www.sonos.com/press/press-releases/introducing-sonos-play-1; Press 
Release, Bose, Bose Introduces New SoundLink Mini Bluetooth Speaker II (June 4, 
2014), available at http://globalpressroom.bose.com/us-en/pressrelease/view/1509. 
 145. See, e.g., Sonos Connect, SONOS, http://www.sonos.com/shop/connect (last 
visited Sept. 1, 2015). 
 146. See, e.g., Bose Bluetooth Audio Adapter, BOSE, http://www.bose.com/products/
speaker_accessories/bose-bluetooth-audio-adapter.html (last visited Sept. 1, 2015). 
 147. As noted supra in note 119, a defendant must demonstrate that (1) the receiving 
apparatus is a kind commonly used in private homes; (2) the broadcast cannot be further 
transmitted to the public; and (3) the defendant’s business is a small commercial 
establishment. Hickory Grove Music v. Andrews, 749 F. Supp. 1031, 1037 (D. Mont. 
1990) (citing Int’l Korwin Corp. v. Kowalczyk, 855 F.2d 375, 378 (7th Cir. 1988)). 
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2. The Second Element: The Quandary of Multiple Receivers 
The second element to satisfy for the Homestyle Exemption requires 
that the system have a “single receiving apparatus.”148 Because wireless 
systems are, by their nature, composed of multiple receivers—the base that 
receives the radio broadcast signal and the receivers located in each speaker 
that receive signals from the base—they could be ineligible for the 
Homestyle Exemption. This will depend on whether a court construes “a 
single receiving apparatus”149 to strictly mean just the receiver component, 
or more broadly to encompass the entire stereo receiving system. Under a 
strict construction of the statute, wireless systems likely fall beyond the 
Homestyle Exemption’s outer limits, even though the additional receivers 
are merely substitutes for speaker wires. 
Alternatively, a court could interpret the receivers in wireless speakers 
as part of a “single receiving apparatus.” Claire’s Boutiques defines 
“receiving apparatus” as encompassing “the receiver, speakers, antenna and 
wiring.”150 The Seventh Circuit concluded that this was the proper 
definition Congress intended, because 
Congress could have, as it does in the legislative history, simply 
used the word “receiver” if it had wanted to limit the analysis. In 
addition, “apparatus” is defined as “the totality of means by 
which a designated function is performed * * * [or] a group of 
machines used together * * * to accomplish a task. A stereo 
system fits neatly into this definition of apparatus; it uses all its 
components to perform the task of converting radio waves into 
audible sound waves.151
3. The Third Element: The Dilemma of the Second Transmitter 
Finally, § 110(5) requires that there be no retransmission of the radio 
signal.152 A retransmission—even one that merely goes from the receiver 
 148. Id. at 1037. 
 149. 17 U.S.C. § 110(5)(A) (2012) (“Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, 
the following are not infringements of copyright: communication of a transmission 
embodying a performance . . . of a work by the public reception of the transmission on a 
single receiving apparatus of a kind commonly used in private homes . . . .” (emphasis 
added)). 
 150. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Claire’s Boutiques, Inc., 949 F.2d 1482, 1493 (7th Cir. 
1991). 
 151. Id. (citations omitted) (modifications in original). 
 152. 17 U.S.C. § 110(5)(A)(ii) (stating that the exception does not apply if “the 
transmission thus received is further transmitted to the public”); Hickory Grove Music v. 
Andrews, 749 F. Supp. 1031, 1037 (D. Mont. 1990) (citing Int’l Korwin Corp. v. 
Kowalczyk, 855 F.2d. 375, 378 (7th Cir. 1988)). 
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to the speaker—could render the Homestyle Exemption inapplicable. Yet 
such a retransmission is a key feature of any type of wireless speaker 
system currently available.153 For a wireless speaker system to function, the 
sound signal must be retransmitted from the stereo base to the speaker’s 
receiver.154 Thus, the Seventh Circuit’s holding in Claire’s Boutiques, 
defining further transmission as using “some device or process that 
expands the normal limits of the receiver’s capabilities,”155 could be a fatal 
blow for wireless systems. 
This final element also illustrates how the Transmit Clause and 
technology may be irretrievably linked, and how the clause is open to 
different interpretations. Is a transmission that can be heard on speakers 
located outside the store’s system (i.e., an “open” system) what Congress 
intended to prohibit? Or is transmission within a “closed” system—
whereby the radio signal is limited to the store’s speakers—also within the 
intended definition of “transmit” with regard to a public performance 
right, and thus a deal-breaker for the Homestyle Exemption? If Congress 
intended that there could be no retransmission outside of a closed system, 
then we need to address whether there must be an actual recipient of the 
signal who intercepts and broadcasts the signal in a nearby store. If not—
that is, if “transmit” does not require that a potential audience be capable 
of receiving the signal—then the form of wireless speakers also matters. 
The next Part discusses these issues. 
III. APPLYING AIKEN TO WIRELESS SPEAKERS 
Regardless of whether they are built-in or added-on, contemporary 
wireless systems come in three forms. First, there are those that transmit 
over a standard radio frequency (RF). A second type also transmits an RF 
signal, but in a closed system, such as Bluetooth.156 Finally, there are those 
 153. See infra notes 162–175 and accompanying text. 
 154. See Your Guide to Buying Wireless Home Theater Speakers, EBAY (June 9, 2014), 
http://www.ebay.com/gds/Your-Guide-to-Buying-Wireless-Home-Theater-Speakers-
/10000000177632035/g.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2015); see also J.D. Biersdorfer, 
Wirelessly Moving Music from Gadgets to the Stereo, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 24, 2008), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/25/technology/personaltech/25basics.html. 
 155. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Claire’s Boutiques, 949 F.2d 1482, 1495 (7th Cir. 
1991). 
 156. Generally, Bluetooth is a communications system that “exchanges data over 
short distances using radio transmissions.” Welcome to Bluetooth Technology 101, 
BLUETOOTH, http://www.bluetooth.com/Pages/Fast-Facts.aspx (last visited Oct. 2, 
2014). The transmission distance for a Bluetooth signal is much shorter than that used in 
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that transmit through an internal intranet Wi-Fi157 system, dubbed by the 
consumer electronics industry as “Play-Fi.”158 While they can be 
generalized as systems where a transmitter sends a signal to receivers 
located in wireless speakers, all three work in very different ways that 
could affect how a court views their eligibility for the Homestyle 
Exemption. Merely relying on radio signals does not make them the same 
as traditional radio signals used by AM and FM radio stations to transmit 
their broadcasts. To treat them as such through “technology blindness” 
ignores fundamental differences—based on how the exemption is 
construed—that could otherwise find the equipment within the 
exemption’s safe harbor. Thus, for each of the three forms of wireless 
speaker systems, we must examine whether this transmission from the 
receiver to the wireless speakers can be seen otherwise than constituting a 
prohibited retransmission.159
For many courts, one particularly relevant characteristic of wireless 
systems is whether the system is technologically “open” or “closed.” In a 
mobile phones, television, or FM radio signals. Id. For a more detailed discussion, see 
infra notes 166–168 and accompanying text. See also IEEE STANDARD FOR 
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 802.15.1-2005 (2005); Specification Adopted Documents, 
BLUETOOTH, https://www.bluetooth.org/en-us/specification/adopted-specifications (last 
visited Sept. 1, 2015). 
 157. According to “How Stuff Works,” Wi-Fi is a wireless network that 
uses radio waves, just like cell phones, televisions and radios do. . . . 
. . . .  
1. A computer’s wireless adapter translates data into a radio signal and 
transmits it using an antenna. 
2. A wireless router receives the signal and decodes it. The router sends 
the information to the Internet using a physical, wired Ethernet 
connection. 
The process also works in reverse, with the router receiving information 
from the Internet, translating it into a radio signal and sending it to the 
computer’s wireless adapter. 
Marshall Brain, Tracy V. Wilson & Bernadette Johnson, How Wi-Fi Works, HOW 
STUFF WORKS, http://computer.howstuffworks.com/wireless-network1.htm (last visited 
Sept. 7, 2014); see also IEEE STANDARD FOR INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 802.11-
2012 (2012); Wi-Fi, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wi-Fi (last visited Sept. 
7, 2014). 
 158. Ty Pendlebury, Streaming-Audio App Play-Fi Takes on Sonos and AirPlay, CNET 
(Sept. 24, 2013, 11:15 AM), http://www.cnet.com/news/streaming-audio-app-play-fi-
takes-on-sonos-and-airplay. For a complete explanation of Play-Fi, see infra notes 172–
175 and accompanying text. 
 159. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (“To ‘transmit’ a performance . . . is to communicate it 
by any device or process whereby images or sounds are received beyond the place from 
which they are sent.”). 
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closed system, the transmitter specifically limits which speakers can receive 
the data. In contrast, an open system indiscriminately provides 
information that can be received both by the intended speakers and by 
others nearby. 
Wired systems, by nature, are “closed” systems, and this feature could 
lead a court to conclude that it is the “closed” nature of wired systems 
should be considered when analyzing wireless speaker technologies. As 
discussed supra, a closed system’s potential audience is limited to 
customers in the store. While Bluetooth and encrypted Play-Fi system 
speakers operate via a closed system, traditional RF and unencrypted Play-
Fi are “open”; the potential audience is much broader, and includes 
whoever can locate a speaker to capture and perform the musical 
work/sound recording. And whether courts will consider the difference 
between open and closed systems in applying the Homestyle Exemption 
depends on whether courts take technology into consideration. Based on 
the above discussions, courts should examine each of the three systems 
using the following assumptions: (1) that Congress intended there be no 
retransmission outside a closed system,160 and (2) that “making the 
transmission available” meets the definition of retransmission, that is, no 
actual interception and broadcast by another party is necessary for there to 
be a “retransmission.”161
A. MHZ SO GOOD: TRADITIONAL WIRELESS LIKELY DOES NOT 
QUALIFY FOR THE HOMESTYLE EXEMPTION 
The oldest form of wireless speakers relies on standard radio waves to 
transmit the signal from the base receiver to the wireless speakers. It is 
comprised of a Radio Frequency (RF) transmitter unit and speakers 
containing radio receivers to capture the signal. The transmitter can either 
be integrated in the stereo receiver, or can be a separate attached unit, and 
typically operates at a frequency near 900 MHz or 2.4 GHz, within one of 
the ISM frequency bands reserved for industrial, scientific, medical, and 
consumer use.162 The signal “can be transmitted over a range of 150 to 300 
 160. In Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., the Supreme Court did not discuss or dispute 
this holding by the Second Circuit. 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2504–07 (2014). 
 161. See supra notes 86–103 and accompanying text. 
 162. ISM band frequencies were set aside by the FCC to prevent industrial and 
scientific instruments such as microwave ovens and RF heaters from interfering with 
AM/FM radio and other FCC regulated frequency transmissions. These unregulated 
bands are also used for consumer devices such as Wi-Fi LAN routers, cordless phones, 
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feet and is not obstructed by walls, ceilings, or floors.”163 It is an “open” 
system: the radio signal is not exclusively sent to the speakers in the store 
where the receiver is located. Use of these standard, non-dedicated radio 
frequencies means that there can be interference and interception of the 
signal reception from other wireless devices.164 Any traditional wireless 
speaker within range of the transmission can pick up the signal and play 
the sound. There is a reason that modern cell phone signals are 
encrypted—just ask Tom Cruise, whose conversations with his then-wife 
Nicole Kidman were intercepted in the early days of cellphone 
technology.165
Not only is the signal quality poor and the sound quality equally so in 
this first generation of wireless speaker technology, but it is also the system 
least likely to comply with the Homestyle Exemption. Anyone with a 
similar speaker in a location within range can intercept and hear the 
retransmitted signal, such as the store next door’s owner. Courts can 
interpret this kind of “retransmission to the public” to be one that requires 
a license, as unauthorized use is a very real possibility with this system. It 
is highly unlikely that a court would find this antiquated technology 
compliant with the Homestyle Exemption. 
B. YOUR IPHONE’S BLUETOOTH CONNECTION
The second form of wireless speaker systems uses “Bluetooth” 
technology. Bluetooth also transmits via an RF signal;166 however, there 
are important differences between the traditional system and a Bluetooth 
system. One key distinction is that the Bluetooth transmitter and speakers 
form a “closed network,” meaning there is a single “pairing” between the 
and wireless speakers, so that consumers do not need to license frequency spectrum to 
make a phone call. See FCC 47 C.F.R. 18 (2007); JOE DICHOSO, FCC CHIEF OF 
EQUIPMENT AUTHORIZATION BRANCH, FCC BASICS OF UNLICENSED 
TRANSMITTERS (2007), available at https://transition.fcc.gov/oet/ea/presentations/files/
oct07/Oct_07-Basics_of_Unlicensed_Trans-JD.pdf; see also Conversation with Mike 
Bobelak, Heartland Field Sales Specialist, Polk Definitive Technology (May 8, 2014) 
(notes on file with author). 
 163. Your Guide to Buying Wireless Home Theater Speakers, EBAY (June 9, 2014), 
http://www.ebay.com/gds/Your-Guide-to-Buying-Wireless-Home-Theater-Speakers-/
10000000177632035/g.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2015). 
 164. Id.
 165. David Rosenzweig, Paparazzo Indicted in Interception of Cruise-Kidman 
Telephone Call, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 11, 1998), http://articles.latimes.com/1998/dec/11/
local/me-52989. 
 166. How Does Bluetooth Work?, SCIENTIFIC AM., http://www.scientificamerican
.com/article/experts-how-does-bluetooth-work (Nov. 5, 2007); Bluetooth, WIKIPEDIA, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bluetooth (last visited Sept. 7, 2014). 
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wireless transmitter and the speaker. The system’s user links the receiver’s 
wireless transmitter signal to a specific speaker, and only those speakers 
with this “permission” (i.e., those paired with the transmitter) can emit the 
sounds sent from the system’s base. Usually, these systems have one 
speaker containing a receiver (the “master”) and a second “slave” speaker 
attached to the “master” via a wire.167 The master speaker receives the 
signal from the base, and the second speaker receives the sound signal 
from the master speaker in the same manner a wired speaker does.168
This is unlike the RF traditional wireless speaker system, because with 
Bluetooth no speakers other than those “paired” with the transmitter are 
able to receive the signal.169 Because the user controls the system and the 
pairing process, the signal cannot be used outside of the closed system. 
Thus a store next door cannot use its own “unpaired” speakers to capture 
the signal and then broadcast the signal in its store. Another distinction is 
the range of a Bluetooth system. Bluetooth operates using short-
wavelength, ultra-high frequency (UHF) radio waves that are much 
shorter than the traditional RF wireless systems.170 These hallmarks of 
Bluetooth make it the wireless speaker system most likely to fall within the 
Homestyle Exemption. A court analyzing this technology with regard to 
the public performance right is unlikely to find that the broadcast is 
capable of being “retransmitted to the public.” Bluetooth’s technological 
limitations are likely its regulatory savior. 
C. THE UNCERTAIN OUTCOME FOR PLAY-FI
“Play-Fi”171 is the industry term for using a wireless “intranet” 
network—a dedicated local “Wi-Fi” wireless router in the home—for 
transmitting and receiving the sound signal from the stereo receiver to the 
wireless speakers, respectively.172 The Play-Fi transmitter (attached to the 
 167. In a Bluetooth system, the transmitter sends a compressed data file, which is 
translated into sound upon reaching the speaker. See How Does Bluetooth Work?, 
SCIENTIFIC AM. (Nov. 5, 2007), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/experts-how
-does-bluetooth-work. 
 168. There are a few rare systems that operate using a matched pair of speakers, 
whereby the signal is split between that pair. See Bobelak, supra note 162. 
 169. Id.
 170. See Welcome to Bluetooth Technology 101, BLUETOOTH, http://www.bluetooth
.com/Pages/Fast-Facts.aspx (last visited Oct. 2, 2014). 
 171. See Pendlebury, supra note 158. 
 172. Bobelak, supra note 162; see also Mike Giffin, DTS Play-Fi Wireless Audio 
Explained, WREN SOUND, http://wrensound.com/dts-play-fi-wireless-audio-explained 
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receiver base) first sends out a signal through the intranet network router 
into the home’s Wi-Fi system to establish a “hand shake” between it and 
the wireless speaker.173 Once the connection has been established, the base 
receiver’s transmitter sends a radio signal to the intranet Wi-Fi and 
onward to any speakers connected to the network for translation into 
sound.174 This system has the advantage of mobility—users can control the 
music station through a smart phone or other mobile computing device. If 
the Wi-Fi network used is encrypted or password protected, then only 
those who have access to the network will be able to broadcast the signal 
on their compatible wireless speakers. If it is an “open” network—meaning 
the network is not encrypted and no password is needed to access the 
system and to pick up the transmission signal—then any compatible 
speaker within range of the system’s router can translate and “perform” the 
copyrighted work sent through the system.175
The determination whether a Play-Fi system falls within the 
exemption is not as straightforward as either the traditional RF or the 
Bluetooth systems. The unencrypted signal more closely resembles the 
traditional RF system, while the encrypted intranet look like a Bluetooth 
receiving apparatus system. Thus, to have a chance of falling within the 
Homestyle Exemption, a storeowner should use an encrypted signal. 
D. STREAMING MATTERS
Another challenge for courts interpreting § 110(5) is whether to 
extend the statute to cover streaming broadcasts. As technology for 
receiving radio broadcasts has evolved, so has the debate over copyright 
infringement and exemptions. Suppose one of the businesses in our 
Introduction chooses to “perform” music in its store via an Internet radio 
or audiovisual streaming site. Because streaming audio is a “digital 
broadcast” transmission, in addition to owners of the rights to musical 
compositions under § 106(4), owners of the performance rights to sound 
(last visited Jan. 30, 2015) (“The Play-Fi protocol uses WiFi as its wireless 
communication path.”). A common use of Play-Fi, streaming content from an online 
music account, would not qualify for the Homestyle Exemption, which only applies to 
broadcast radio stations. See infra, Section III.D. 
 173. Bobelak, supra note 162. 
 174. Id.
 175. Id.; see also DTS, INC., DTS PLAY-FI™: MULTIROOM WIRELESS STREAMING 
ENABLES A NEW HOME AUDIO ECOSYSTEM 4–5 (2013), available at http://www.dts
.com/~/media/7cd1fbdd3663497f9608f7a220bcd1ae/9302K76100A_WP_DTS
_PlayFi.pdf. 
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recordings would have § 106(6)176 rights.177 While the work is “intended 
to be received by the general public,” or at least those who have an 
Internet connection, it is less clear whether using an Internet radio station 
as the source of the transmission would fall within the safe harbor of 
§ 110(5).178 “Live streaming” from a service such as Pandora (using either 
a computer or another device as the “receiving apparatus”) requires 
examination of how this technology fits under the law.179 It is now 
common to listen to music via a digital audio transmission through one’s 
smartphone. Section 110(5) does not contemplate the use of digital audio 
transmissions—even § 110(5)(B) limits its use to over-the-air radio and 
television broadcasts, and cable/satellite non-broadcast transmissions.180
Congress could not have imagined the existence of the streaming audio 
and video either in 1976, when § 110(5)(A) was enacted, or in 1998 when 
it added § 110(5)(B) via the Fairness in Music Licensing Act.181 Section 
110(5) merely states, “notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, the 
following are not infringements of copyright.”182 This would thus appear 
to include the public performance rights granted in both § 106(4) and 
§ 106(6). This is another dimension to consider when determining if a 
business owner needs a license to perform the streaming music signal in 
her store, or whether the Homestyle Exemption covers digital public 
performance rights. 
 176. 17 U.S.C. § 106(6) (2012) (“[T]he owner of copyright under this title has the 
exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following: in the case of sound 
recordings, to perform the copyrighted work publicly by means of a digital audio 
transmission.”). 
 177. See supra notes 164–171 and accompanying text. While § 110(5)(A) does not 
specify that the communication of the performance by the public be via an over-the-air 
radio or television broadcast, § 110(5)(B) does specify the types of public performance 
transmissions that fall within its exemption. 
 178. § 110(5)(B). 
 179. Live Streaming is defined as “transmit[ing] or receive[ing] live video and audio 
coverage of (an event) over the Internet.” Live Streaming Definition, OXFORD 
DICTIONARY, http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/live-
stream (last visited Oct. 5, 2014). 
 180. 17 U.S.C. § 110(5)(B) (2012) (limiting the Homestyle Exemption to 
“communication by an establishment of a transmission or retransmission embodying a 
performance . . . [of a] work intended to be received by the general public, originated by a 
radio or television broadcast station . . . , or, if an audiovisual transmission, by a cable 
system or satellite carrier”). 
 181. See Fairness in Music Licensing Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 
(1998). 
 182. 17 U.S.C. § 110. 
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Consequently, all three forms of wireless technology have significant 
similarities and differences which affect the traditional analysis under the 
Homestyle Exemption. While using a technology-blind approach as 
prescribed in Aereo to determine whether streaming signals fall within this 
safe harbor may or may not affect a court’s finding under § 110(5), it 
would be the wrong way to analyze these systems. 
IV. TECHNOLOGY BLINDNESS 
There is a larger issue at stake than whether wireless speaker systems 
fall within the Homestyle Exemption, and whether courts should consider 
the technology underlying these systems when making an assessment. 
What is at stake here is whether courts generally should examine an 
underlying technology when construing laws and making legal 
assessments. 
In order to make current copyright law applicable to technological 
advancements, should courts summarily find that new technology falls 
outside antiquated definitions, and thus beyond what is acceptable? 
Should courts examine the technology at issue based on its purpose and 
the congressional intent behind the relevant statute, or look for outward 
similarities to technologies covered under the law, regardless of the 
underlying mechanics? It is vital that we thoroughly consider the 
implications of a judicial philosophy whereby courts ignore the underlying 
mechanisms at play and instead focus strictly on how new technology 
“looks” to the end user. That is to say, whether the underlying technology 
involved in an infringement claim should be considered, or whether courts 
should read the Copyright statute in a “technology-blind” manner is a 
particularly important issue. 
This Part discusses the implications of the Supreme Court’s recent 
Aereo decision. It then illustrates how technology blindness would affect 
the analysis of wireless technology under the Homestyle Exemption and 
examines other unintended results of a technology-blind approach. 
A. TECHNOLOGY BLINDNESS AND AEREO
The recent Supreme Court decision in Aereo gives significant weight to 
the concept of “technology blindness.”183 And as alluded to in Justice 
Scalia’s dissent, ignoring technology can have overreaching and 
 183. See generally Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014). 
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unintended negative consequences that can ultimately stifle competition 
and hinder innovation.184
1. The Aereo Decision 
Aereo was a company that developed an antenna system to meet the 
needs of people who lived in locations where their home lacked the direct 
line-of-sight vantage point to receive free, over-the-air television 
broadcasts and who did not want to pay for a cable television 
subscription.185 Aereo’s system can be analogized to asking your next door 
neighbor, who lives in a ten-story house—which affords her better 
reception—if you can place a television antenna on her roof and run the 
antenna cable from her home to your two-story home.186 Your neighbor 
agrees, but rather than stringing an ugly wire between your homes, she 
suggests instead that you access your antenna through the Internet. Aereo 
used an “economy of scale”187 to provide this service to many people—it 
 184. See infra notes 257–264 and accompanying text. 
 185. See, e.g., Jeremy Sheff, A Personal Take on Aereo, JEREMY SHEFF (June 26, 2014), 
http://jeremysheff.com/2014/06/26/a-personal-take-on-aereo-with-some-philosophical
-ruminations (“[T]his system can be seen as analogous to a homeowner putting their TV 
antenna on the roof of their house to get better reception. There’s a bit more to Aereo 
than that, but truly, that’s all my family wanted: an antenna in a more suitable location 
than our living room, with a wire connecting it to our TV.”); see also Tim Wu, The 
Supreme Court Thinks You Are Better Off Paying $150/Month for Cable, NEW REPUBLIC
(June 25, 2014), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/118390/supreme-court-aereo-
decision-wet-kiss-cable-tv (“Free, over-the-air TV is available to anyone willing to put up 
an antenna. Aereo’s idea was to lease tiny antennas to its customers, and thereby make it 
easier for people to grab the signals and bring them home. In fact, you could easily 
duplicate Aereo’s service by putting an antenna on your roof; Aereo’s idea was just to 
make that task more convenient, by acting as a virtual antenna installation man.”); Mark 
P. McKenna, The Limits of the Supreme Court’s Technological Analogies: The Misguided 
Aereo Decision Shows Why Technical Details Matter, SLATE (June 25, 2014) 
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2014/06/abc_v_aereo_ruling_the
_supreme_court_s_terrible_technological_analogies.single.html. According to McKenna, 
one might view Aereo as “simply supplying a more convenient and technologically 
sophisticated substitute for putting an antenna on your roof . . . . It is therefore no 
different than the delivery of content from the antenna on your roof to the television set 
in your house.” Id.
 186. This is known as “the longer cord argument—that there is no difference 
between a consumer’s use of a rooftop antenna and her use of a remote antenna except 
the length of the cable.” See Giblin & Ginsburg, supra note 89, at 23. 
 187. “Economies of scale” is a term used in microeconomics, whereby a business 
obtains a cost advantage due to “a reduction in the cost of producing something brought 
about especially by increased size of production facilities.” Economy of Scale, MERRIAM-
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was as if thousands of people ran virtual coaxial cables via the Internet 
from their homes to Aereo’s facility, where their antennas were actually 
located. In this manner, “Aereo’s system allow[ed] users to access free, 
over-the-air broadcast television through antennas and hard disks located 
at Aereo’s facilities.”188
When developing their novel system for providing customers with the 
ability to receive free, over-the-air broadcast transmissions, founders 
Chaitanya Kanojia189 and Barry Diller190 relied on the Second Circuit’s 
decision in Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc. (aka Cablevision).191
Based on the holding in Cablevision, they believed their system would not 
infringe on the copyrights of the free, over-the-air programs viewed by its 
subscribers.192
Several portions of the court’s rationale in Cablevision were relevant to 
Aereo’s antenna system design. First, as in Cablevision, individual Aereo 
customers directed the recording and subsequent playback of content,193
which constituted “volitional conduct.”194 Second, like in Cablevision, each 
WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/economy%20
of%20scale (last visited Mar. 20, 2015). 
 188. Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc. (Aereo I), 874 F. Supp. 2d 373, 376–77 
(S.D.N.Y. 2012), rev’d sub nom. WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d 676 (2d Cir. 
2013), rev’d sub nom. Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014). 
 189. Chaitanya Kanojia Profile, BLOOMBERG BUSINESS, http://www.bloomberg
.com/Research/stocks/private/person.asp?personId=640878&privcapId=138725 (last 
visited Mar. 20, 2015). 
 190. Victor Luckerson, Aereo Backer Barry Diller: “It’s Over Now,” TIME (June 25, 
2014), http://time.com/2921376/aereo-barry-diller. 
 191. Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc. (Cablevision), 536 F.3d 121 (2d 
Cir. 2008). See supra text accompanying notes 85–100. 
 192. See Giblin & Ginsburg, supra note 89, at 7 (“Aereo built its system in reliance on 
the Second Circuit’s interpretation of the Transmit Clause in Cartoon Networks v. CSC 
Holdings.”). 
 193. See Cablevision, 536 F.3d at 133 (“[C]opies produced by the RS-DVR system 
are ‘made’ by the RS-DVR customer, and Cablevision’s contribution to this reproduction 
by providing the system does not warrant the imposition of direct liability.”); see also 
Giblin & Ginsburg, supra note 89, at 10 (noting that the Second Circuit in Cablevision 
analogized to the VCR at issue in Sony, reasoning “that, in the case of a VCR it would be 
‘the person who actually presses the button to make the recording . . . who supplies the 
necessary element of volition, not the person who manufactures, maintains or, if distinct 
from the operator, owns the machine.’” (quoting Cablevision, 536 F.3d at 131)). 
 194. “[D]espite copyright infringement’s strict liability standard, ‘there should still be 
some element of volition or causation . . . .’” Giblin & Ginsburg, supra note 89, at 9 
(quoting Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n Servs., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 
1370 (N.D. Cal 1995)). The Netcom court found that the element of volition “is lacking 
where a defendant’s system is merely used to create a copy by a third party.” Netcom, 907 
F. Supp. at 1370. 
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potential audience for a transmission was a single subscriber, so this 
transmission did not meet the definition of “transmit to the public” under 
the 1976 Act.195 Buoyed by the Cablevision decision, Aereo moved 
forward with their business model, and in February of 2012, it began 
selling subscriptions in New York City. Customers rented equipment 
located in Aereo’s warehouse that gave subscribers access to those local 
over-the-air broadcasts (for viewing via the Internet), which the 
consumers had the right to view without paying subscription fees or 
licenses to cable or satellite companies.196
Aereo’s system thus provides the functionality of three devices: a 
standard TV antenna, a DVR, and a Slingbox-like device. These 
devices allow one to watch live television with the antenna; pause 
and record live television and watch recorded programming 
using the DVR; and use the Slingbox to watch both live and 
recorded programs on internet-connected mobile devices.197
Soon after Aereo’s system went live, local New York City broadcasters 
filed complaints claiming copyright infringement and sought to enjoin 
Aereo from operating. Initially, Aereo’s argument—that its system was not 
infringing under the holding of Cablevision—was successful; the District 
Court for the Southern District of New York,198 and the Second Circuit199
 195. Cablevision, 536 F.3d at 135 (“[E]ach RS-DVR transmission is made using a 
single unique copy of a work, made by an individual subscriber, one that can be decoded 
exclusively by that subscriber’s cable box, only one subscriber is capable of receiving any 
given RS-DVR transmission.”). 
 196. Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc. (Aereo I), 874 F. Supp. 2d 373, 382 (S.D.N.Y. 
2012) (“Aereo argues that as in Cablevision it effectively rents to its users remote 
equipment comparable to what these users could install at home.”), rev’d sub nom. 
WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc. (Aereo II), 712 F.3d 676 (2d Cir. 2013), rev’d sub nom. 
Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014). It is important to note that the 
television broadcasts at issue were not those that are only transmitted via cable or satellite, 
but rather solely for those over-the-air broadcasts from local television stations, such as 
the local affiliates for ABC, CBS, NBC, Univision, and PBS as well as independent 
local-only television stations. Aereo limited the stations one could receive based on the 
zip code of the subscriber. Aereo II, 712 F.3d at 680 (“Aereo is currently limited to 
subscribers in New York City and offers only New York area channels.”). 
 197. Aereo II, 712 F.3d at 682. The Slingbox, developed by Sling Media, transmits a 
television signal (after it has been received in a home) over the Internet, so that a person 
can watch programs available on her home television on her computer. See generally 
Discovering Slingbox, SLINGBOX, http://www.slingbox.com/DiscoverSling.aspx (last 
visited Mar. 20, 2015). 
 198. Aereo I, 874 F. Supp. 2d at 405. 
 199. Aereo II, 712 F.3d at 696. 
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both ruled in its favor. In finding that Aereo did not infringe, the District 
Court compared Aereo’s system of mini-antennas to the RS-DVR system 
in Cablevision.200 First, the court pointed out that “from the user’s 
perspective, Aereo’s system is similar in operation to that of a digital video 
recorder (DVR), particularly a remotely located DVR, although Aereo 
users access their programming over the Internet rather than through a 
cable connection.”201 Second, like in Cablevision, there is no sharing of the 
performances between users.202 The District Court devoted a large portion 
of its opinion to the technical function of Aereo’s system and how Aereo’s 
operations comported with a finding that its system did not transmit “to 
the public.”203 Ultimately, the court held that because Aereo’s transmission 
was not public, it did not infringe the plaintiffs’ copyrights.204
In affirming the lower court, the Second Circuit also focused on how 
Aereo’s system worked “behind the scenes.”205 The appellate court noted 
that the copies made for later viewing by Aereo’s system were not 
infringing under Cablevision.206 The court focused on two dispositive 
 200. Aereo I, 874 F. Supp. 2d at 385 (“[T]he copies Aereo’s system creates are not 
materially distinguishable from those in Cablevision, which found that the transmission 
was made from those copies rather than from the incoming signal.”); see also id. at 386 
(“As in Cablevision, the functionality of Aereo’s system from the user’s perspective 
substantially mirrors that available using devices such as a DVR or Slingbox, which allow 
users to access free, over-the-air broadcast television on mobile internet devices of their 
choosing.”). 
 201. Id. at 377 (citations omitted). 
 202. Id. at 378, 382–85 (“[J]ust as the antennas are not shared when they are in use, 
the data obtained by a particular antenna while allocated to a particular user is not shared 
with or accessible by any other Aereo user.” (internal quotations omitted)). 
 203. Id. at 377–81, 388. 
 204. Id. at 405. 
 205. WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc. (Aereo II), 712 F.3d 676, 680–83 (2d Cir. 
2013), rev’d sub nom. Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014). 
 206. Id. at 689–90. In applying the holding in Cablevision, the appellate court noted 
that: 
Cablevision’s transmissions of programs recorded with its RS-DVR 
system were not public performances [based on] two essential facts: 
First, the RS-DVR system created unique copies of every program a 
Cablevision customer wished to record. Second, the RS-DVR’s 
transmission of the recorded program to a particular customer was 
generated from that unique copy; no other customer could view a 
transmission created by that copy. Given these two features, the 
potential audience of every RS-DVR transmission was only a single 
Cablevision subscriber . . . And because the potential audience of the 
transmission was only one Cablevision subscriber, the transmission was 
not made “to the public.” 
Id. (citations omitted). 
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features from Cablevision: (1) the unique copies made by each subscriber 
and (2) the limited potential audience of each transmission to an audience 
of one.207 As both features were present in the Aereo system,208 the court 
affirmed that Aereo’s transmissions were not public.209
The Second Circuit recognized both the right of viewers to receive 
over-the-air broadcasts and that Aereo merely facilitated this right for 
those with a limited ability to install an adequate antenna: 
It is beyond dispute that the transmission of a broadcast TV 
program received by an individual’s rooftop antenna to the TV in 
his living room is private, because only that individual can receive 
the transmission from that antenna, ensuring that the potential 
audience of that transmission is only one person. Plaintiffs have 
presented no reason why the result should be any different when 
that rooftop antenna is rented from Aereo and its signals 
transmitted over the internet: it remains the case that only one 
person can receive that antenna’s transmissions.210
The appellate court also stressed that it was not uncommon for 
entrepreneurs to develop innovative technology in order to avoid 
infringing another’s copyright—often by relying on legal precedence for 
direction.211
Aereo’s luck ran out, however, when the Supreme Court took a 
different view of its antenna array. The Supreme Court focused on how 
Aereo’s antenna array appeared to function to the unassuming end user; in 
doing so, it also choose a different end user perspective from the district 
court,212 which compared Aereo’s playback function to the home DVD 
 207. Id. at 693 (“Aereo’s system would not be creating public performances, since the 
entire chain of transmission from the time a signal is first received by Aereo to the time it 
generates an image the Aereo user sees has a potential audience of only one Aereo 
customer.”). 
 208. Id. at 690 (“The same two features are present in Aereo’s system.”). 
 209. Id. at 691 (“[T]he relevant inquiry under the Transmit Clause is the potential 
audience of a particular transmission, not the potential audience for the underlying work 
or the particular performance of that work being transmitted.”). 
 210. Id.
 211. Id. at 694 (“Aereo is not the first to design systems to avoid copyright 
liability . . . . Nor is Aereo alone in designing its system around Cablevision, as many 
cloud computing services, such as internet music lockers . . . appear to have done the 
same.”). 
 212. Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2508–09 (2014). On 
November 21, 2014, Aereo filed for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy protection. Emily Steel, 
Aereo Concedes Defeat and Files for Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 22, 2014), 
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player.213 Writing for the 6–3 majority, Justice Breyer explained that when 
viewed from the point of an end user, the defendant’s activities looked like 
a cable system.214
Justice Breyer implied that the Court’s characterization of the 
technology as perceived by the consumer was what mattered, giving no 
weight to other possible ways a consumer might view the technology, nor 
how the underlying technology itself functioned. By doing so, he created a 
quandary: how does a court determine which among several competing 
technology-blind points of view is the “end user’s perspective” that it 
should use? How does an innovator, worried that her new technology 
might lead to an infringement suit, know which point of view a court 
would choose? 
Even though he chose a technology-blind approach, Breyer 
acknowledged the differences between how Aereo and cable television 
operated—specifically that each performance transmitted through Aereo’s 
antenna array was only capable of being received by a single subscriber.215
In terms of the Act’s purposes, these differences do not 
distinguish Aereo’s system from cable systems, which do perform 
“publicly.” Viewed in terms of Congress’ regulatory objectives, 
why should any of these technological differences matter? They 
concern the behind-the-scenes way in which Aereo delivers 
television programming to its viewers’ screens. They do not 
render Aereo’s commercial objective any different from that of
cable companies. Nor do they significantly alter the viewing 
experience of Aereo’s subscribers. Why should subscriber who 
wishes to watch a television show care much whether images and 
sounds are delivered to his screen via a large multisubscriber 
antenna or one small dedicated antenna, whether they arrive 
instantaneously or after a few seconds’ delay, or whether they are 
transmitted directly or after a personal copy is made?216
Consequently, Breyer discounted the differences in the technological 
architectures. While the Court acknowledged the differences between 
Aereo’s and cable television operations, held that “[i]n terms of the Act’s 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/22/business/aereo-files-for-bankruptcy.html?smid=pl-
share. 
 213. Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc. (Aereo I), 874 F. Supp. 2d 373, 377 (S.D.N.Y. 
2012) (“[F]rom the user’s perspective, Aereo’s system is similar in operation to that of a 
digital video recorder.”), rev’d sub nom. WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d 676 
(2d Cir. 2013), rev’d sub nom. Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014). 
 214. Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2508–09. 
 215. Id. at 2508. 
 216. Id. at 2508–09. 
1383-1450_LIEBESMAN_AUTHORPROOF 06032015 (DO NOT DELETE) 11/2/2015 9:35 PM 
1430 BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 30:2  
purposes, these differences [did] not distinguish Aereo’s system from cable 
systems, which do perform ‘publicly.’”217 This is reminiscent of the 
rationale used in Jewell-Lasalle.218 By ignoring a key “behind the scenes” 
difference between Aereo’s system and cable television’s, Breyer was able 
to claim that, if Aereo’s system did not infringe, 
could not modern CATV systems simply continue the same 
commercial and consumer-oriented activities, free of copyright 
restrictions, provided they substitute such new technologies for 
old? Congress would as much have intended to protect a 
copyright holder from the unlicensed activities of Aereo as from 
those cable companies.219
On the surface it does appear that Aereo’s system would provide a 
work-around for the traditional cable television stations (especially when 
viewed through a “technology-blind” lens) however, the underlying 
technological architecture can be distinguished in a significant way. 
Aereo’s system is one where each user has her own antenna—a one-to-one 
match—and is in control as to what is received by that antenna.220 Cable 
television, on the other hand—whether when it was in its infancy or in its 
modern form—is a “one to many” system.221 The cable television operator 
receives the signals and then rebroadcasts them indiscriminately en-mass. 
Subscribers receive all programs, and then choose which program to view. 
Under this “one-to-many” system of secondary transmissions, CATV 
operators are required to license the broadcast stations (via compulsory 
licenses under Sections 111 and 119 of the Copyright Act).222 In addition, 
 217. Id. at 2508. 
 218. Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191 (1931); see supra notes 24–29 
and accompanying text. 
 219. Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2509.
 220. See Eriq Gardner, Supreme Court Hands Broadcasters Huge Win in Aereo Battle, 
HOLLYWOOD REP (June 25, 2014), http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/aereo-
ruling-supreme-court-hands-711333. 
 221. See A. Michael Noll, The Evolution of Media 4 (2007) (“Such communication 
from one to many is called broadcast” (emphasis omitted)); see also Gordon Greb & Mike 
Adams, Charles Herrold, Inventor of Radio Broadcasting 220 (2003) (discussing early 
“broadcasting of entertainment and information, pre-announced, and directed toward a 
known audience,” in comparison to the “radiotelephone”). 
 222. 17 U.S.C. § 111(d) (2012) (titled “Statutory License for Secondary 
Transmissions by Cable Systems”); see also Evolution of Cable Television, FCC.GOV, 
http://www.fcc.gov/encyclopedia/evolution-cable-television (last updated March 14, 
2012) (“The Copyright Act requires cable operators to obtain a compulsory license for 
the carriage of programming.”). 
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the hundreds of channels transmitted solely by television networks are not 
broadcast over-the-air and require separate, negotiated licenses—
essentially every channel except for the local broadcast stations, such as 
New York affiliates of ABC, NBC, CBS, PBS, as well as the local-only 
broadcast stations such as WPIX fall under the latter.223 Today, the typical 
cable operator retransmits over 200 channels, almost all of which are 
unavailable for reception through over-the-air broadcast antenna 
capture.224 As discussed infra, this technological difference should result in 
a significant legal consequence. 
The Supreme Court also justified its opinion by claiming that its 
viewpoint was most in line with congressional intent underlying the 
Transmit Clause.225 The majority leapt to the conclusion that since 
Congress sought to use the Transmit Clause to overturn two Court 
decisions that found cable television transmissions were not public 
performances, this also meant that Congress intended the clause to apply 
to “an entity that acts like a CATV system . . . , even when it simply 
enhances viewers’ ability to receive broadcast television signals.”226 Under 
this brutally broad interpretation, all manufacturers and sellers of rooftop 
antennas are also acting like cable television systems and are thus equally 
performing and infringing because they, too, enhance a viewer’s ability to 
receive broadcast television signals. 
2. Is It Cable, or Is It Antenna? 
By assuming that consumers viewing programming via Aereo would 
think they were watching cable television, the Court took a technology-
blind approach: without referencing any evidence in support of its 
assumption, the Court made a factual conclusion that consumers watching 
television via Aereo would naturally think that it was a cable television 
transmission.227
 223. See, e.g., Peter Burrows, Lucas Shaw and Gerry Smith, Apple Said to Delay Live 
TV Service to 2016 as Negotiations Stall, BLOOMBERG (AUG. 13, 2015),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-08-13/apple-said-to-delay-tv-service-to-
2016-as-negotiations-stall (discussing licensing negotiations between Apple and 
numerous broadcasting companies). 
 224. See, e.g., Your Greenville, Laurens, Anderson & Spartanburg, SC Channel Lineup, 
GOUPSTATE.COM, http://www.goupstate.com/assets/pdf/SJ17941825.pdf (last visited 
Nov. 6, 2014) (channel lineup for Charter Communications). 
 225. Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2509. 
 226. Id. at 2506. 
 227. This is disturbingly reminiscent of the Court’s decision in Gonzales v. Carhart, 
550 U.S. 124 (2007), to uphold the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, a federal law 
which prohibited a medical procedure that anti-choice politicians labeled “partial birth 
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This approach is muddled further by the possibility that more than one 
technology-blind viewpoint could serve as the reference point for the 
consumer’s perspective and illustrates a major flaw to this approach. Justice 
Breyer could just have easily decided that, to the viewer, Aereo’s system 
looked like a home antenna. Why—despite the obvious comparison to a 
home antenna—wasn’t the home antenna the “technology blindness” 
vantage point used by the Supreme Court? In fact, to the viewer, Aereo’s 
antenna array more closely resembles home antenna reception than it does 
cable television for several obvious reasons. First, cable television gives a 
wide array of programming with hundreds of available channels, and non-
broadcast stations transmit programming that is only accessible via cable 
or satellite television.228 By contrast, a home antenna is limited to local 
broadcast stations—usually between four and twelve total.229 To a viewer 
perusing the available channels via Aereo, they would appear no different 
than those available through an antenna. Thus, any television viewer who 
is limited to local broadcast stations—and understands that to receive 
more stations, one needs a cable television subscription—is more likely to 
believe that the channels received through Aereo to be via an antenna, not 
abortions.” Writing for a 5–4 majority, Justice Kennedy declared he knew how women 
must feel about terminating a pregnancy when he wrote that the choice of “[w]hether to 
have an abortion requires a difficult and painful moral decision. While we find no reliable 
data to measure the phenomenon, it seems unexceptionable to conclude some women come 
to regret their choice to abort the infant life they once created and sustained.” Id. at 159 
(emphasis added). 
 228. Glossary of Terms, NIELSEN MEDIA, http://www.nielsenmedia.com/glossary/
terms/C/ (last visited Nov. 23, 2014) (defining a Cable TV System as “[a] non-broadcast 
facility which distributes signals of one or more television stations and non-broadcast 
services to subscribers”); Compulsory License, FCC Regulations and Retransmission 
Consent—Rube Goldberg Would Be Proud!: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, IP and 
the Internet of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 3 (2013) (testimony of Preston 
Padden) (“[T]the programs on more than 500 non-broadcast channels—channels like 
Discovery, History Channel, ESPN, and HBO—are NOT subject to compulsory 
licensing, retransmission consent and associated FCC regulations. The programs on these 
non-broadcast channels are distributed . . . through free market negotiations.” Mr. 
Padden further testified: “When licensing programs for its channel, the non-broadcast 
channel owner simply secures from the program owner he right to sublicense the program 
to the cable and satellite distributors that carry the channel.”), available at http://judiciary.
house.gov/_files/hearings/113th/09102013/Padden%20testimony%20091013.pdf. 
 229. Though an expensive home antenna located in a large metropolitan area, such as 
Baltimore, Maryland, could receive up to forty local broadcasts from the nearby markets, 
many would be redundant stations. See, e.g., Mike Snider, Cutting the Cord: Antennas Let 
You Tune in TV for Free, USA TODAY (Apr. 19, 2014, 9:44 AM), http://www.usatoday.
com/story/tech/personal/2014/04/19/cutting-the-cord-antennas/7870817. 
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via cable TV. Second, cable television charges significantly higher fees 
than Aereo did. Aereo’s pricing was a large selling point,230 and the Court 
is mistaken if it believes that consumers cannot recognize this difference. 
Third, Aereo subscribers were fully aware how the system worked. This 
information was readily available on Aereo’s website, and consumers could 
consciously decide to purchase an Aereo subscription with this knowledge. 
To view the consumer as oblivious to the underlying technology behind 
Aereo insults the consumer’s intelligence. 
By comparing the Aereo system to a rooftop antenna, even a 
technology-blind Court would have a solid basis for its decision, based on 
Congress’s very specific intent to give television viewers the right to receive 
free, over-the-air television broadcasts. Title 47 of the Code of Federal 
Regulations stipulates that licensed broadcast “stations must . . . transmit 
at least one over-the-air video program signal at no direct charge,”231 and 
section 15 of that Title requires that all televisions imported into or sold in 
 230. See, e.g., Sheff, supra note 185; Wu, supra note 185. 
 231. 47 C.F.R. § 73.624(b) (2014). This requirement applies to both “Class A” 
television stations and digital television (DTV) broadcast stations: 
DTV “broadcast station permittees or licensees must transmit at least 
one over-the-air video program signal at no direct charge to viewers on 
the DTV channel. Until such time as a DTV station permittee or 
licensee ceases analog transmissions and returns that spectrum to the 
Commission, and except as provided in paragraph (b)(1) of this section, 
at any time that a DTV broadcast station permittee or licensee 
transmits a video program signal on its analog television channel, it 
must also transmit at least one over-the-air video program signal on the 
DTV channel. The DTV service that is provided pursuant to this 
paragraph must be at least comparable in resolution to the analog 
television station programming transmitted to viewers on the analog 
channel. 
47 C.F.R. § 73.624(b). Class A stations are low powered television stations (a.k.a. local 
community access channels). Class A Television Service, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia
.org/wiki/Class_A_television_service (last visited Nov. 2, 2014); Marshall Brain, How 
Digital Television Works, HOW STUFF WORKS, http://electronics.howstuffworks
.com/dtv3.htm (last visited Nov. 2, 2014). In 2009, the United States completed the 
transition from analog television to digital television to allow for other uses in the analog 
TV radio spectrum, via section 3002(a)(1)(B) of the Digital Television Transition and 
Public Safety Act of 2005. Digital Television Transition and Public Safety Act of 2005, 
Pub. L. No. 109-171. Generally, digital television “is the transmission of audio and video 
by digitally processed and multiplexed signal, in contrast to the totally analog and channel 
separated signals used by analog television. Digital TV can support more than one 
program in the same channel bandwidth.” Digital Television, WIKIPEDIA, http://en
.wikipedia.org/wiki/Digital_television (last visited Nov. 2, 2014); Digital vs. Analog, PBS, 
http://www.pbs.org/opb/crashcourse/digital_v_analog/ (last visited Mar. 20, 2015). 
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the United States be capable of receiving these stations.232 In spite of the 
Court holding in Aereo that viewers “perform,”233 viewing programs on 
one’s own private television does not infringe on the public performance 
copyright right delineated in the Act.234
It should be equally non-infringing for someone who—unable to 
receive signals because it is impossible to string an antenna for reception of 
locally available broadcast signals—chooses to rent a remote antenna 
within her viewing area that is situated at a better vantage point. As long 
as control of the antenna is by the customer, it is no different than the 
customer accessing her rooftop antenna, and neither the antenna owner 
nor its lessee would be infringing. Rather, both would be acting within the 
confines and expectations of FCC regulations. Nothing in the law limits 
what the viewer may use as a conduit to receive these stations. 
Thus, the Court’s “looks like” test is problematic because there may be 
several reasonable alternative technologies that could serve as a comparison 
point. A trier of fact may have difficulty choosing which, among several 
reasonable alternatives (some infringing, some not), the consumer thinks is 
the source of the broadcast. The “looks like” method may lead jurists to 
arrive at divergent findings of fact about future technologies; this will 
cause further conflict and have an unsettling effect on innovation. 
B. TECHNOLOGY BLINDNESS AND AIKEN
A technology blind approach would affect a court’s analysis of the 
Homestyle Exemption. To a customer going from store to store in our 
Introduction, there is no difference between the two methods of reception 
(wired or wireless) with regard to the music she hears; she does not know 
or care whether she is hearing music that emanated from an over-the-air 
radio station, an Internet radio station, or from a simultaneous live-stream 
of an over-the-air radio station over the Internet. 
To store owners who want to use wireless speaker technology without 
having to pay for a public performance license, the holding in Aereo seems 
 232. 47 C.F.R. § 15.117(b) (2013) (“TV broadcast receivers shall be capable of 
adequately receiving all channels allocated by the Commission to the television broadcast 
service.”). 
 233. Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2500 (2014) (“[B]oth the 
broadcaster and the viewer ‘perform,’ because they both show a television program’s 
images and make audible the program’s sounds.” (emphasis in original)). 
 234. 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (2012) (“to perform the copyrighted work publicly”). Here, 
the viewer’s “performance” is not “public.” See id.
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to provide a path out of the quandary of whether these systems could be 
installed without being subject to the license requirement or facing 
infringement actions. As discussed supra,235 the Court in Aereo relied on 
the concept of “resembling” a cable company’s transmission of a signal, 
citing (1) Congress’ decision to legislatively overturn the Court’s 
Fortnightly and Teleprompter decisions,236 and (2) how, from the 
consumer’s standpoint, Aereo’s system resembles that of a cable television 
company, and thus was infringing on the plaintiffs’ copyright.237
Analogizing this to the storefront using wireless speakers, from the 
consumer’s vantage the broadcast she hears is no different than if it had 
been performed via a wired speaker system. Both systems are commonly 
used in homes, and as long as there was no modification of the wireless 
system so that it more closely resembled a commercial one, then by 
applying the technology-blind approach of Aereo, the Homestyle 
Exemption would provide a safe harbor for the storeowner. Thus, if 
wireless speakers are viewed as being the same as a wired system from the 
point of view of the customer in the store (the audience), then by applying 
“technology blindness,” a court would find that such a system resemble 
wired speakers, and would thus be noninfringing. The behind-the-scenes 
technology would not matter, wireless and wired speakers look the same to 
the consumer, and therefore should be treated the same under the 
Homestyle Exemption. Yet this is not how the courts have been instructed 
to make the Homestyle Exemption determination. Rather, which 
mechanism is used may play a dispositive role in determining the 
outcome.238 This Article’s discussion of the Homestyle Exemption 
illustrates that Congress is very cognizant of the need for courts to 
examine the underlying technology when determining infringement of the 
public performance right. 
To require that applications of the Transmit Clause be read in a 
technology-blind manner, especially when read in conjunction with other 
sections of the Act, can easily conflict with the language of those other 
sections.239 Further, there is no indication or guidance from Congress that 
 235. See supra note 212 and accompanying text. 
 236. Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390 (1968); 
Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 415 U.S. 394 (1974); Am. Broad. 
Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2505 (2014) (“In 1976 Congress amended the 
Copyright Act in large part to reject the Court’s holdings in Fortnightly and 
Teleprompter.”). 
 237. Id. at 2508–09, 2511. 
 238. See supra Section II.E. 
 239. See, e.g., supra notes 124–138 and accompanying text. 
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this should be the case. In many sections, such as the Homestyle 
Exemption, the technological design of the sound system must be 
considered in the factual determination of infringement. If we applied this 
“how does it look to the consumer?” analysis to our storefronts, it would 
conflict with the legislative intent as well as the language of § 110(5). 
Thus, a technology-blind approach would ignore the plain language of 
§ 110(5). As discussed supra, unlike the wired systems contemplated when 
§ 110(5) was enacted, wireless speakers, by their very nature, require both 
a transmitter that retransmits the radio signal, as well as a receiver in each 
of the speakers, both of which on their face do not fall within the statutory 
requirements for an exemption to the public performance right under 
§ 110(5)(A). Rather than throw up our hands, despondent over this 
predicament, courts can rely on congressional intent to construe the 
existing law in such a way as to effectuate the purpose of the law. 
Especially with regard to copyright law, the 1976 Act language, on its 
face, illustrates that Congress did not want it to be confined to the 
technology that existed when it was enacted, but rather wanted it to 
accommodate future innovations that would be subject to the Act. As 
previously discussed by this Author240 and others,241 Congress is aware 
that when it is attempting to accommodate technological advancements 
into copyright law, it is perpetually lagging behind the innovations. Slow 
updates to § 110(5) are merely another example of this lag. 
In addition, there is no guarantee that the Supreme Court would apply 
“technology blindness” broadly to find a safe harbor from infringement via 
the Homestyle Exemption, even though it has adopted the approach 
 240. See Yvette Joy Liebesman, Downstream Copyright Infringers, 60 KAN. L. REV. 1, 
32 (2011) [hereinafter Liebesman, Downstream Copyright] (discussing generally a 
legislative solution to innocent downstream infringing); Yvette Joy Liebesman, The 
Wisdom of Legislating for Anticipated Technological Advancements, 10 J. MARSHALL REV.
INTELL. PROP. L. 154, 156 (2010) [hereinafter Liebesman, Legislating] (“At various 
times, Congress has chosen to wait and see if a scientific advancement adapts sufficiently 
under current law, and in other instances has tried to anticipate how technology will 
affect society.”). 
 241. See, e.g., Wilk, supra note 71, at 785 (discussing, in part, how the standard set 
forth in Section 110(5) “is not stable, as advances in technology continually redefine the 
parameters of the homestyle equipment standard”); Jessica D. Litman, Copyright 
Legislation and Technological Change, 68 OR. L. REV. 275 (1989) (exploring and critiquing 
Congress’s method of creating of copyright legislation by negotiating with affected 
private parties, industries, and others with vested interests, thus illustrating the historical 
dilemmas that Congress has always faced in adapting copyright law to sometimes fast-
moving technological advancements). 
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elsewhere. As discussed supra, in Aereo the Court used “technology 
blindness” to find a comparable apparatus based on what the viewer thinks 
the technology resembles. Absent a licensing agreement or falling within 
the exceptions of § 111,242 performance by a system that resembled an 
infringing technology would constitute infringement. Using this cognitive 
framework, the small antenna system created by Aereo was transmitting 
an unauthorized broadcast.243 For the Homestyle Exemption, however, a 
court would be comparing wired versus wireless speakers to find whether 
the latter method of converting radio waves into audible sound waves is 
similar enough to qualify as a safe harbor against the copyright owner’s 
public performance or transmission rights. Additionally, courts could treat 
the “looks like to the consumer” test differently for an infringement 
determination than an exemption analysis. That is, adopting technology 
blindness when determining infringement does not guarantee that a court 
will construe exemptions in the same fashion. Indeed, to do so would be 
contrary to the practice of construing rights broadly and exemptions 
narrowly.244
If rights and exemptions are both subject to “technology blindness,” 
courts could find that a wireless speaker system “resembles” a wired system 
without examining the differences in the technologies. Courts could thus 
conclude that a safe harbor from infringement of the public performance 
right exists, without even considering the commercial or home nature of 
the system. Since the wireless system looks no different to the consumer in 
any of the five stores in our Introduction, the Supreme Court’s holding in 
Aereo and the Second Circuit’s decision in Cablevision could be used to 
expand the Homestyle Exemption to encompass wireless speaker 
technology. But this would be reaching the correct conclusion using the 
wrong analysis, and on a larger scale, is not the correct way to approach 
these kinds of issues. 
C. TECHNOLOGY BLINDNESS BEYOND AIKEN AND AEREO
The adoption of “technology blindness” has a strong chance of 
inhibiting innovation and investment in new businesses and technologies, 
all for the sake of preserving the current media content distributors’ 
 242. 17 U.S.C. § 111 (2006) (providing exceptions that include secondary 
transmissions within a hotel or where statutory licenses are paid). 
 243. Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2511 (2014). 
 244. See supra notes 104 and accompanying text. 
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paradigm.245 Yet just as the catastrophic prophecies of the movie industry’s 
doom if Sony won back in 1984246 did not come to pass, a holding in favor 
of Aereo is unlikely to have led to the destruction of copyright owners’ 
rights, and instead could have led to further innovative methods of 
disseminating media. 
After Aereo, the Court has made it impossible for an innovator to 
adequately determine how courts will interpret her new technological 
advancement in an infringement action, if the technology itself is not a 
determining factor. Technological work-arounds to avoid infringement are 
hallmarks of innovation and industry growth.247 Viewed either as merely 
renting equipment, or as the volitional transmission by a single viewer (not 
 245. Professors Ginsburg and Giblin—in an article published prior to the Aereo
decision, asserted that “technology blindness” is the correct position for courts to take, 
because otherwise it would wreak havoc on copyright owners’ rights. Giblin & Ginsburg, 
supra note 89, at 19–22. The authors argue that “it is undesirable for legal outcomes to 
depend so heavily on technical design” and seem to think that technology blindness can 
be read into the copyright statute “without discouraging technological innovation.” Id. at 
3. The professors are concerned that if Aereo had prevailed, cable companies would adapt 
their technology and provide each person with their own individual transmissions to 
avoid paying royalties under § 111. Id. at 19–21. This would cause havoc with the 
economic remuneration for copyright owners. Id. (“[P]laintiff broadcasters have claimed 
that Time Warner Cable has already ‘threatened to develop its own Aereo-like system to 
avoid compensating copyright owners and broadcasters for the use of their 
programming.’”). The professors claim that a decision in favor of the broadcasters will not 
discourage innovation of technology that mimics the “longer cord” argument, and while 
Aereo failed at this, others may be more successful. Id. at 23 (“Absent any way of making 
a principled distinction between consumers transmitting performances to themselves 
from their own antenna on their roof, and the antenna they rent in a remote array, 
businesses may potentially be able to retransmit television signals without license even 
without any time-shifted copies.”). “The key would simply be to ensure that their system 
architecture mimics rooftop antennae sufficiently closely.” Id. at 23. Yet Aereo attempted 
to closely model their system’s architecture to that of a rooftop antenna; the professors 
claim that one which somehow modeled this even “closer” could be sufficient to pass 
muster, but provide no guidance as to how—or even if—this could happen. 
 246. See Sony Corporation of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 
(1984). 
 247. Cf. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Wabash Appliance Corp., 304 U.S. 364, 369 (1938) (“The 
limits of a patent must be known for the protection of the patentee, the encouragement 
of the inventive genius of others and the assurance that the subject of the patent will be 
dedicated ultimately to the public.”); cf. Lorelei Ritchie de Larena, What Copyright 
Teaches Patent Law About “Fair Use” and Why Universities Are Ignoring the Lesson, 84 OR.
L. REV. 779, 786 (2005) (noting that a statutorily-created fair use exemption in patent 
law would incentivize universities, research institutions, and companies “to investigate 
existing technology so that they could truly innovate, including innovations aimed at 
creating patentable improvements and noninfringing ‘work-around’ inventions”). 
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to the public), Aereo was using an innovative method to comply with the 
Transmit Clause as previously interpreted by the courts.248 Accordingly, 
the rationale behind the majority in Aereo—that is, its technology-blind 
approach—is wrong and problematic. 
V. TECHNOLOGY MATTERS 
Courts should continue to evaluate copyright litigation in light of the 
technology at issue in the case. This Part first briefly discusses the 
historical foundation of this argument, then discusses Justice Scalia’s 
dissent in Aereo. It then posits future related discussions that are beyond 
the scope of the Article. 
A. EXPANDING TECHNOLOGY IN TIME 
Scrutinizing technology in copyright decisions is not new. Early 
examples include Burrow-Giles Lithographic v. Sarony in 1884, where the 
Court upheld the constitutionality of including photographs as 
copyrightable subject matter under the Copyright Act of 1831.249 In 
White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., in 1908, the Court 
examined the technology of player piano rolls to determine if it was subject 
matter under the Act.250 More recently, in 1995, the First Circuit used a 
technology analogy in Lotus Development Corp. v. Borland International, 
Inc.251 In that case, the court held that the menus at the top of the screen 
of a computer spreadsheet program were a method of operation and 
therefore not copyrightable subject matter under § 102 of the 1976 Act.252
In dicta, the court compared this user interface to the Play and Stop 
 248. As Judge Chin noted in his Second Circuit dissent, Aereo’s 
system employs thousands of individual dime-sized antennas, but there 
is no technologically sound reason to use a multitude of tiny individual 
antennas rather than one central antenna; indeed, the system is a Rube 
Goldberg-like contrivance, over-engineered in an attempt to avoid the 
reach of the Copyright Act and to take advantage of a perceived 
loophole in the law. 
WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc. (Aereo II), 712 F.3d 676, 697 (2d Cir. 2013) (Chin, J., 
dissenting), rev’d sub nom. Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014). Yet 
one person’s loophole and sham is another person’s work-around for the purpose of 
complying with the law. 
 249. See Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884). 
 250. 209 U.S. 1 (1908). 
 251. 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995), aff’d, 516 U.S. 233 (1996). 
 252. Id. at 816–17. 
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buttons on a VCR,253 noting that “[h]ighlighting the ‘Print’ command on 
the screen, or typing the letter ‘P,’ [was] analogous to pressing a VCR 
button labeled ‘Play.’”254
Thus, from the expansion of technologies covered under the older 
copyright acts255 to the current phrasing of “now known or later 
developed” in the present Act, Copyright Law is based in innovation. 
Technology matters, and it is meant to be inclusive. It is the role of 
Congress, not the courts, to decide where an innovation should be 
excluded from rights and exemptions afforded under the Copyright Act. 
The Second Circuit recognized in both Cablevision and Aereo that, when 
applying the Transmit Clause, technical architecture matters.256
B. THE AEREO DISSENT
In his dissent in Aereo, Justice Scalia understood that interpreting 
statutes without considering advances in technology will result in more 
uncertainty, inhibit innovation, and deny innovators the freedom to look 
for new ways to follow the law. To Scalia and his fellow dissenters,257
technology does matter. His introduction succinctly states his problem 
with the majority’s opinion: 
Petitioners . . . broadcast copyrighted programs on the public 
airwaves for all to see. Aereo . . . operates an automated system 
that allows subscribers to receive, on Internet-connected devices, 
programs that they select, including the Networks’ copyrighted 
programs. The Networks sued Aereo [for violating] the 
Networks’ “exclusive right” to “perform” their programs 
“publicly.” That claim fails at the very outset because Aereo does 
 253. Id. at 817 (“In many ways, the Lotus menu command hierarchy is like . . . a 
[VCR]. . . . Users operate VCRs by pressing a series of buttons that are typically labeled 
[sic] ‘Record, Play, Reverse, Fast Forward, Pause, Stop/Eject.’” With a VCR, the way 
“the buttons are arranged and labeled does not make them a ‘literary work,’ nor does it 
make them an ‘expression’ of the abstract ‘method of operating’ a VCR via a set of labeled 
buttons. Instead, the buttons are themselves the ‘method of operating’ the VCR.”). 
 254. Id. The First Circuit provided no guidance as to whether this is a situation 
where the court examined the underlying technology or how it appears to the end user. 
 255. As noted in note 16 supra, the first Copyright Act of 1790 only covered books, 
charts and maps. Over time, the list of fixed media was expanded to cover other forms of 
technology, such as photographs, motion pictures, and sound recording. 
 256. WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc. (Aereo II), 712 F.3d 676, 694 (2d Cir. 2013), 
rev’d sub nom. Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014). 
 257. Justices Thomas and Alito joined Justice Scalia. Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2511 
(Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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not “perform” at all. The Court manages to reach the opposite 
conclusion only by disregarding widely accepted rules for service-
provider liability and adopting in their place an improvised 
standard (“looks-like-cable-TV”) that will sow confusion for 
years to come.258
Rather than relying on the amorphous and confusing “what does it 
look like to the end user?” test to determine whether Aereo publicly 
“performed,” both Justice Scalia and the Second Circuit differentiated 
between direct and indirect infringement, and the long-held reliance on 
the “volitional conduct” test for direct infringement as described in 
Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line Communication Services, Inc.
(Netcom).259 In Netcom, Judge Whyte of the Northern District of 
California found that “despite copyright infringement’s strict liability 
standard, ‘there should still be some element of volition or causation, 
which is lacking where a defendant’s system is merely used to create a copy 
by a third party.’”260 Thus, the person who owns the machine is not 
necessarily the person who possesses it, uses it, or has access to it.261
Absent some volitional conduct by an equipment owner like Aereo, courts 
should not impose liability for direct infringement.262
Justice Scalia also recognized that the majority’s opinion will result in 
an inhibition of innovation: “It will take years, perhaps decades, to 
determine which . . . systems now in existence are governed by the 
traditional volitional-conduct test and which get the Aereo treatment 
(and . . . systems now in contemplation will have to take their chances).”263
The majority “provide[d] no criteria for determining when its cable-TV-
look-alike rule applies,”264 whether it should be considered specific to cable 
television “look-alikes” or whether a broader “what does it look like to the 
consumer” test governing any technology that is affected by the 1976 Act, 
 258. Id. at 2511–12. 
 259. 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995); Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2514 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
 260. Giblin & Ginsburg, supra note 89, at 9–10 (citing Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 
1370). 
 261. See Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc. (Cablevision), 536 F.3d 121, 
131 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 262. See Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2514 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The distinction between 
direct and secondary liability would collapse if there were not a clear rule for determining 
whether the defendant committed the infringing act. The volitional-conduct requirement 
supplies that rule; its purpose is not to excuse defendants from accountability, but to 
channel the claims against them into the correct analytical track.”). 
 263. Id. at 2517. 
 264. Id. at 2516. 
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or if it is even broader than that, applying to any technology affecting any 
law. What Justice Scalia seems to suggest is that (1) without certainty, 
there will be less innovation and this is an anathema to the rule of law, and 
(2) developing technology that purports to comply with the law should not 
require prior congressional approval. Indeed, courts have long held that in 
spite of what could be “harsh and unintended consequence[s], judges 
should refrain from legislating from the bench.”265 Scalia pointedly stated 
that it was “not the role of this Court to identify and plug loopholes [in 
the law]. It is the role of good lawyers to identify and exploit them, and 
the role of Congress to eliminate them if it wishes.”266 The innovators at 
Aereo created a technology that, based on previous court decisions, they 
believed worked around broadcasters’ public performance copyright right. 
The fear expressed by scholars267—that a decision favoring Aereo 
would eviscerate the public performance right—ignores the fundamental 
difference between Aereo and cable television. Any loss of control is 
limited to programming over which the broadcasters already had limited 
rights. Indeed, systems like Aereo’s actually would be a way to recapture 
rights that Congress had deemed copyright owners did not own. Aereo’s 
system only gave viewers access to those few over-the-air broadcast 
stations that are freely available to all who can receive the signal through 
the airwaves, and that television viewers are legally entitled to watch 
without paying any additional fees. The majority of cable television 
viewers receive hundreds of channels, and the vast majority are not 
available for capture over-the-air. Cable television operators must 
 265. Liebesman, Downstream Copyright, supra note 240, at 25 (citing Exxon Mobile 
Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 565 (2005) (“It is up to Congress rather 
than the courts to fix” unintentional drafting gaps.); United States v. Hopkins, 427 U.S. 
123, 125 (1976) (per curiam) (“[I]t is up to Congress to remedy this apparent harsh 
result. . . . [T]he court should refrain from legislating by judicial fiat.” (second alteration 
in original) (quoting Keetz v. United States, 168 Ct. Cl. 205, 207 (1964) (per curiam), 
superseded by statute, Tucker Act Amendment of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-350, 84 Stat. 449, 
as recognized in Slattery v. United States, 635 F.3d 1298, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en 
banc))). 
 266. Id. at 2517–18 (quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 
U.S. 417, 456 (1984) (“It may well be that Congress will take a fresh look at this new 
technology, just as it so often has examined other innovations in the past. But it is not our 
job to apply laws that have not yet been written.”)). 
 267. See, e.g., Giblin & Ginsburg, supra note 89. 
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negotiate licenses to receive and transmit those signals.268 There is no 
avoiding this, and workarounds such as Aereo’s would not provide a refuge 
from infringement. As long as there are people who want to watch the 
NCAA Men’s Basketball Tournament or Monday Night Football—both 
only available through cable television269 and with all of the retransmission 
prohibitions firmly attached—non-broadcast television will continue to 
thrive. 
It is a bad precedent to outlaw third parties from facilitating the 
exercise of rights which viewers legally possess via the relabeling of that 
facilitating activity through judicial fiat. Based on this “looks like cable” 
perception, the legality of any device that sends a signal from one’s home 
antenna into one’s intranet may also be in jeopardy. For example, 
Nuvyyo270 and Simple.TV271 sell equipment that sends television broadcast 
signals received from a home antenna through the home’s Wi-Fi, which is 
then watchable on a computer. Are these also rebroadcasts because the 
program is viewed on one’s computer, rather than a standard television, 
and thus “appear” to be like cable? Simple.TV has a subscription option 
(like Aereo) for features beyond its basic system, such as pausing live TV 
 268. See, e.g., Alex Ben Block, Viacom Blackout Continues as Small Cable Company 
Takes Stand in Retrans Fight, HOLLYWOOD REP. (Apr. 2, 2014), http://www
.hollywoodreporter.com/news/viacom-blackout-continues-as-small-693143. 
 269. CBS/Turner Sports has contracted for the rights to broadcast the early rounds of 
the NCAA men’s basketball tournament through 2024, and Monday Night Football is 
locked in with ESPN until 2021. See Thomas O’Toole, NCAA Reaches 14-Year Deal with 
CBS/Turner for Men’s Basketball Tournament, Which Expands to 68 Teams For Now, USA
TODAY (Apr. 22, 2010), http://content.usatoday.com/communities/campusrivalry/post/
2010/04/ncaa-reaches-14-year-deal-with-cbsturner/1#.ViJ-1fkzaUl; Richard Sandomir, 
ESPN Extends Deal With N.F.L. for $15 Billion, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/09/sports/football/espn-extends-deal-with-nfl-for-15-
billion.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2014). 
 270. Nuvyyo sells a device called Tablo, marketed as “a DVR for TV antennas that 
targets this growing trend of mobile TV consumption and enables consumers to save 
thousands of dollars by canceling expensive cable and satellite TV contracts and replacing 
them with free Over-The-Air (OTA) HDTV.” NUVYYO, http://nuvyyo.com (last visited 
Nov. 5, 2014). The Tablo box plugs into one’s TV antenna and uses the home’s Wi-Fi to 
transmit the signal to mobile devices and laptops. Nuvyyo describes Tablo as “a next-
generation DVR that plugs into an HDTV antenna to capture free, local HDTV 
broadcast programs including news and sports within the US and Canada . . . . Tablo 
connects to your home network using Wi-Fi or Ethernet to stream content to any 
connected device inside your home or anywhere you have internet.” How Tablo Works, 
TABLO TV, https://www.tablotv.com/how-tablo-works/ (last visited Nov. 5, 2014). 
 271. Simple.TV describes itself as “a lovely little box that sits on your home network, 
connects to an aerial antenna . . . and streams TV to your devices, plus records to storage 
that you attach.” Welcome to Simple.TV, SIMPLE.TV, http://us.simple.tv/ (last visited 
Nov. 5, 2014). 
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and accessing it outside your home network.272 Because there is a 
subscription fee, is this the tipping point for a court to find that this device 
“resembles cable television”? Or is it merely the viewing of the program on 
one’s computer rather than a standard television? Where is the line to be 
drawn? 
Perhaps instead the problem the Court sees with Aereo is one of 
commercialization. That is, receiving the free, over-the-air broadcast 
signal is fine, as long as no one other than the copyright owner has the 
ability to commercialize reception of the signal, even indirectly. There is 
no way of knowing—the Court’s majority gave no guidance in its holding, 
leaving lower courts to navigate the quagmire. 
With such uncertainty, inventors and entrepreneurs would risk 
infringement lawsuits and bankruptcy if they moved forward with an 
innovation that they otherwise believe to be noninfringing because their 
device or system “looked like” an infringing one from one possible—no 
matter how improbable—viewpoint of a technology-naïve audience. The 
risk would be too great, and innovative ideas would likely be inhibited 
from being actualized, for fear that the Court would hold that it did not 
approve of the new technology. This resulting inhibition is contrary to the 
ultimate goals of the Copyright Clause.273
C. FUTURE DISCUSSIONS
This Article illustrates just some examples of the problems associated 
with ignoring technology with regard to copyright litigation. In spite of 
the Aereo decision, courts—based on their ability to distinguish Aereo from 
the facts before them—will hold conflicting views on technology 
blindness.274 Their disparate findings and their implications are worth 
 272. Kate Cox, You Can Make Your Own Aereo At Home, But Is It Worth It?, 
CONSUMERIST (May 31, 2014), http://consumerist.com/2014/05/31/you-can-make-
your-own-aereo-at-home-but-is-it-worth-it/ (last visited Nov. 5, 2014). 
 273. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8. (“To promote the Progress of Science and useful 
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their 
respective Writings and Discoveries.”). 
 274. See, e.g., CBS Broad. Inc. v. FilmOn.com, Inc., No. 10 CIV. 7532 NRB, 2014 
WL 3702568 (S.D.N.Y. July 24, 2014) (holding that FilmOn’s mini-antenna, Internet 
viewing broadcast television system was similar to Aereo’s, based on the Supreme Court’s 
analysis of the latter that it was “like cable”); see also Cartoon Network LP v. CSC 
Holdings, Inc. (Cablevision), 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding that the underlying 
technology at issue is significant in determining whether it has substantial non-infringing 
uses). 
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further analysis; this and other issues raised extend beyond what may be 
discussed in a single article. 
The formation of a unifying theory regarding the treatment of 
technology in copyright is a larger issue which is ripe for development. 
When courts should or should not consider technology in their 
deliberations extends beyond the Transmit Clause and the Homestyle 
Exemption. The question especially extends to matters where Congress is 
silent—though it also apparently arises even where Congress has spoken. 
Clauses that are silent on the subject are often read in conjunction with 
those that speak to it. For example, the Transmit Clause contains no 
technology-specific language, but it is often paired with sections that do. 
Further discussion is warranted regarding how judicial interpretation of 
the above discussed issues via objective principles of construction would 
influence their validity. Doctrines of statutory construction—touched on 
briefly in Part II—would influence a finder of fact who is deliberating an 
infringement claim, or the applicability of a safe harbor. 
Furthermore, is a court truly being “technology blind” when it merely 
compares one form of technology another? As with Aereo, the court takes a 
superficial look at technology in its “looks like cable” attitude, but then 
states that it should not consider the underlying technology that is at the 
heart of the definitions of Transmit and Secondary Transmissions. Should 
it be an “all or nothing” proposition? While holding that Aereo was “like” 
a cable company for the purposes of the Transmit Clause, the majority 
also intimated that Aereo was not like a cable company with regard to 
§ 111, and thus could not procure compulsory licenses under that section 
of the Copyright Act.275 How do such holdings comport with the 
legislative intent—as well as the language—of the applicable sections? 
Finally, further dialogue is warranted as to how technology blindness 
would hinder innovation beyond copyright law; investment in new 
technologies, venture capital, start-up and entrepreneurial risks, as well as 
patenting implications all need to be examined. 
 275. On remand before the district court Aereo pursued, and was denied, a theory of 
being treated as a cable company entitled to a compulsory license under § 111. Am. 
Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., No. 12-CV-1540, 2014 WL 5393867, at *2–6 (S.D.N.Y. 
Oct. 23, 2014) (noting that “not all entities that perform publicly in ways similar to cable 
systems are entitled to the § 111 license”). 
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VI. FINAL THOUGHTS 
In the years immediately following the enactment of the Homestyle 
Exemptions, scholars examined and prodded the statute, studying its flaws 
and whether it actually solved the problem it attempted to address—that 
is, providing small businesses an exemption to the public performance 
right of § 106(4).276 Congress was clear that copyright protection is not a 
rent-seeking vehicle, and that certain uses of another’s copyrighted 
material would not require permission. It viewed the mere playing of a 
radio in a storefront as one of those exceptions. Yet the technological 
limits in § 110(5) were based on what was commonly found in homes in 
1976.277 Were it a static statute, storefronts would be limited to the 
devices found in homes in 1976. Congress, however, made it clear that 
this was not the case, and new technologies in question must be examined 
based on contemporary findings of what is commonly found in homes. 
Legislators were clear that the underlying, “behind the scenes” technology 
did matter. Other sections of the 1976 Act also contemplate the actual 
technology in use,278 as do related statutes, such as the FCC sections 
discussed herein. Thus, courts have long been directed to interpret various 
sections of the 1976 Act based on new technology not yet envisioned 
when the law was enacted. The finder of fact has at his or her disposal the 
ability to examine the facts and the technology, and to reach a conclusion 
based on how the actual technology fits within the law. 
It is tempting to ignore technology that one does not understand. 
Sometimes it will not matter, and a court could achieve the same result 
 276. See generally Shipley, supra note 127; Wilk, supra note 71; James B. MacDonald 
II, Defining the Limits of the Home-Type Receiver Exemption in 17 U.S.C. § 110(5): Cass 
County Music Co. v. Muedini, 4 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 147 (1997); Makeen, supra
note 83. 
 277. The 1995 Act implementing § 110(5)(B) recognized technological 
advancements that happened between 1976 and 1995. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 47 
(1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5660. 
 278. The Copyright Act is full of examples where Congress uses technology-specific 
language, such as the Audio Home Recording Rights Act of 1992 and the Digital 
Performance Right in Sound Recording Act. Audio Home Recording Act of 1992, Pub. 
L. No. 102-563, 106 Stat. 4237; Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 
1995, Pub. L. No. 104-39, 109 Stat. 336. The latter provides great detail and technical 
specifications regarding licensing for digital broadcasts and limitations on the right. 
While there are some technology-neutral sections, these cannot be considered in a 
vacuum. Rather the language at issue should be addressed as a whole, including any 
incorporated technology-neutral sections, and should give relevance to the technology-
specific language. 
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either way. While there may be situations where ignoring technology 
provides a safe harbor for a would-be infringer—such as illustrated in this 
Article with wireless speaker technology—it will more likely lead to a 
stifling of innovation. As illustrated, courts have other avenues for 
conferring wireless speakers a safe harbor under the Homestyle Exemption 
without resorting to hand waving and declaring themselves technologically 
unsavvy. Deliberations do not require the use of a Sesame Street-
resembling “one of these things is not like the others” exercise as to 
whether a new technology resembles others already in existence.279
This Article is not merely another example of the interaction between 
law and technology. Nor is it an additional illustration of how the law’s 
failure to keep up with innovation might lead to unintended and undesired 
adverse consequences that were not contemplated when the Copyright Act 
was debated. Rather, as emphasized supra,280 there is a larger issue at 
stake—that the Court is setting a dangerous precedent for technology 
blindness when, against all evidence to the contrary, it held that 
underlying technology does not matter when construing infringement 
under the Transmit Clause in the Copyright Act of 1976. There are 
serious flaws and ramifications if courts instead feign technology ignorance 
and blind themselves to how innovations actually work when making these 
crucial holdings. To which technology do we compare it? As with Aereo, 
when examining an innovation that seeks to comply in a new way with an 
existing law, there may be more than one from which to choose. The 
Court’s majority decision could lead to a change in the current paradigm 
of allowing innovation to flourish and then legislating when an invention 
adversely affects public policy,281 instead playing into the hands of those 
seeking to protect their market from new players. Innovators would need 
to first have their inventions cleared as being “noninfringing” by Congress 
before moving forward.282 This is contrary to Court precedent, and 
Congress has repeatedly shown itself capable of legislating for specific 
technology that it deems falls outside the bounds of the public policies it 
 279. A well-known segment of Sesame Street is titled: “One of these things is not 
like the others.” See, e.g., Sesame Street, Sesame Street: One of These Things, YOUTUBE
(July 16, 2010), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6b0ftfKFEJg. 
 280. See supra Part IV. 
 281. See generally Liebesman, Legislating, supra note 240. 
 282. See, e.g., Brief for Ralph Oman, Former Register of Copyrights of the United 
States, as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 14, WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 
712 F.3d 676 (2d Cir. Sept. 21, 2012) (Nos. 12-2786-cv, 12-2807-cv) (arguing that 
“[c]ommercial exploiters of new technologies should be required to convince Congress to 
sanction a new delivery system and/or exempt it from copyright liability”). 
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wishes to promote.283 This philosophy of “seeking permission first” has 
been long desired by rights holders who “claim that the sky is falling 
whenever a new technology threatens an existing business model.”284 Such 
a policy would give undue influence to those who are already “players” 
attempting to protect their market share in an anticompetitive manner, 
thwart new entrants to the marketplace, and stifle innovation. But such 
fears are rarely brought to fruition. As stated by Professor Mark Lemley, 
“if you claim that the sky is falling whenever a new technology threatens 
an existing business model, the rest of the world can be forgiven for not 
believing you when you claim that this time around it’s going to be 
different.”285 While new technology usually alters an industry’s business 
model, causing certain revenue streams to decline, it also opens up new 
opportunities.286
Justice Scalia notes in his Aereo dissent that the Court should wait for 
Congress to act, and not on its own create new law to encompass the new 
innovations the way it thinks the law should go.287 New technologies 
should not have the burden of proving their right to exist, yet this is 
exactly what this decision threatens to implement.288 This Author also has 
 283. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 500 (1984) 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“Like so many other problems created by the interaction of 
copyright law with a new technology, there can be no really satisfactory solution to the 
problem presented here, until Congress acts . . . .” Justice Blackmun contended that “[w]e 
must ‘take the Copyright Act . . . as we find it,’ and ‘do as little damage as possible to 
traditional copyright principles . . . until the Congress legislates.’”). See generally
Liebesman, Legislating, supra note 240, at 179 (“[L]egislation has attempted to fill in the 
gaps in copyright protection when, after the technology had reached an advanced level of 
development and public use, it concluded that further protection was needed.”). 
 284. Mark A. Lemley, Is the Sky Falling on the Content Industries?, 9 J. TELECOMM.
& HIGH TECH. L. 125, 132 (2011). 
 285. Id.
 286. Id.
 287. Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2518 (2014) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (“[T]he proper course is not to bend and twist the Act’s terms in an effort to 
produce a just outcome, but to apply the law as it stands and leave it to Congress the task 
of deciding whether the Copyright Act needs an upgrade.” Justice Scalia went on to 
conclude, “as the Court concluded in Sony: It may well be that Congress will take a fresh 
look at this new technology, just as it so often has examined other innovations in the past. 
But it is not our job to apply laws that have not yet been written.”). 
 288. See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 284, at 133 (“[I]nnovation regimes in which no one 
can develop a new technology unless they get the collective permission of all the content 
owners whose content might be distributed with that technology are not going to 
work.”); Peter S. Menell, Envisioning Copyright Law’s Digital Future, 46 N.Y.L. SCH. L.
REV. 63, 129 (2003) (“Even before the free flow of content in the Napster and post-
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previously argued that Congress usually waits for technology to develop, 
then steps in if the technology operates against the policies that Congress 
wishes to support.289 If congressional intent is unclear, it is not up to the 
Court to play clairvoyant. Rather, Congress should step up and clarify the 
breadth of copyright owners rights encompassed as questions arise 
concerning new technology which cannot be reconciled under the current 
Act. 
The Homestyle Exemption is just one example of how certain public 
performances are not within copyright owners’ bundle of rights. Business 
owners who play radio and television programs for their customers’ 
enjoyment are shielded from rent-seeking by content owners and 
providers. And in determining whether the exemption applies, the 
technology in use is glaringly key. This should be no less true for other 
exemptions, such as the right to receive free, over-the-air broadcast 
television performances in one’s home. 
Knowing the bounds of our rights through court decisions is not 
restricted to intellectual property. We abhor laws that are vague and fail to 
state boundaries that we cannot cross. If the courts are free to move these 
boundaries based on their own concept of what a technology “looks like,” 
they are rejecting one of the central foundations of our legal system—
confidence and certainty in the rule of law.290
Napster era, the content industries actively resisted the introduction of digital 
technologies and used the threat of such technologies as a basis for obtaining new 
legislation expanding rights and enforcement powers of copyright owners.”). 
 289. See Liebesman, Legislating, supra note 240, at 177. 
 290. See, e.g., Liebesman, Downstream Copyright, supra note 240, at 29–30. 
